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Abstract 
THE PHENOMENON OF MATCH-FIXING IN SOCCER: A PLAGUE WITHOUT A  
CURE? 
by 
Nikolaos (Nick) Petropoulos 
Advisor: Professor Maria (Maki) Haberfeld, Ph.D. 
Introduction: Today, match-fixing is considered as one of the most significant threats to the 
integrity of soccer. Everyone seems to talk about it. However, the phenomenon itself has 
received relatively limited academic interest despite the media coverage that match-fixing 
scandals have enjoyed, mainly over the last 10-15 years. This study will seek to explore the 
match-fixing landscape and provide a detailed account of how extensive the phenomenon is and 
who are the main stakeholders.To achieve this goal, we will rely heavily on a series of 
INTERPOL bi-weekly reports on match-fixing cases that cover the period from 1
st
 of January 
2013 until 30
th
 of June 2017.  
Methods: The present dissertation will utilize the tools of secondary data analysis and 
quantification of qualitative data to pursue its objectives and test a series of hypotheses. The 
process of conducting a quantitative analysis of qualitative data will include three main steps: 
First, organize the data; second, read it and code it and third, and then present and interpret it. To 
conduct the analyses, the main statistical tools used include descriptive statistics, correlations, T-
Test and Analysis Of Variance (ANOVA). SPSS statistical software was used to conduct the 
data analysis. 
 v 
 
Theoretical framework: To better understand the phenomenon of match-fixing the present 
study utilized and drew from three major criminological theories, namely Differential 
Association, Routine Activity, and Strain theory. 
Discussion and findings: Match-fixing is a significantly widespread phenomenon that could 
occur at –literally- every country on the planet. While various stakeholders are involved in 
match-fixing cases, the analyses conducted in the present study show that players are heavily 
involved in fixed games and are the most likely to get arrested in countries that legislation is in 
place. Additionally, organized crime syndicates play an important role and are involved in 
match-fixing cases across the globe. More importantly, it seems that corruption is a key in 
addressing match-fixing as countries who rank low in the corruption index are not only less 
willing to introduce effective anti- match-fixing criminal legislation but are also ineffective in 
curtailing the phenomenon.  
Also, although the criminal law is an important tool against match-fixing our findings 
demonstrate that specialized legislation that appears to be more effective and promising than 
ordinary criminal law measures.However, it is not just the criminalization of match-fixing that is 
important; both criminalization of the phenomenon and penalty severity could prove promising 
regarding unveiling players’ participation in match-fixing, according to our findings 
Conclusion: A series of recommendations were made based on the finding of this study. The 
analyses show that countries across the globe with a focus on the most corrupted one should 
implement and effectively use specialized legislation on match-fixing to curtail the phenomenon. 
Unless said legislation is introduced, the majority of match-fixing plots will remain below the 
radar maintaining a deceiving sense of immunity from the phenomenon. Also, more attention 
 vi 
 
should be paid to the role of players in match-fixing as our statistical findings suggest that their 
involvement in match-fixing cases is not only significant but quite extensive as well. 
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 Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
Overview 
The recent revelations in 2015 about the FIFA scandal that involved the organization’s 
president Sepp Blatter himself, shocked soccer fans across the globe and questioned the integrity 
of the most popular sport on the planet (Conn, 2017). Although allegations of corruption in 
soccer is not a new phenomenon (Jennings,2006), the scandals over the last decade fueled the 
debate on how to protect soccer’s integrity, and national and international authorities were urged 
to address the problem (Spapens, 2014). 
Despite the fact that, from a criminological point of view, match-fixing -is just one form 
corruption, it represents the greatest of all the threats to the integrity and appeal of soccer, a 
danger that is described as “the biggest threat facing the future of the sport in Europe” (Serby, 
2012). Moreover, the nature of the threat posed by fixed games has gradually changed and has 
now become more imminent than ever due to two main reasons:  
First off,  the relationship between sport and business was transformed considerably and 
over the last 20 years the commercialization of sport has altered the landscape; not surprisingly, 
sport betting has skyrocketed, and it is estimated that the global gambling industry (both legal 
and illegal) is worth  up to a $3 trillion a year with 65% of that money coming from betting on 
soccer games worldwide (UNODC, 2015).   Second, thanks to the Internet and the ability to bet 
on every possible outcome, the chances of making a massive financial profit by betting on fixed 
games are very high compared to the likelihood of getting caught. That said, match manipulation 
business becomes very appealing not only to individuals but also to international organized 
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crime. Moreover, organized crime syndicates could potentially target hundreds of national league 
games (those offered on the betting market), cup matches, international competitions and 
friendlies for possible match manipulation, and every country is vulnerable, regardless of its 
record on corruption.  Inevitably, manipulation of soccer games damages players, fans and the 
sport itself. Also, the integrity of soccer is seriously harmed if the outcome of the game is known 
in advance given that the unpredictability of a game’s outcome is the most appealing element of 
the sport. 
However, some questions remain unanswered. How extensive is the phenomenon? Who 
is involved in match-fixing? Is it mainly about organized crime or individual actors, such as 
players and referees? What should be done to contain it? Therefore, the purpose of this 
dissertation is bi-fold: 
 Firstly, it will seek to identify the scope of the phenomenon over the last four years and 
analyze how widespread it is worldwide.  
Secondly, it will attempt to evaluate the effectiveness of the current legislative 
approaches adopted by countries across the globe and, eventually, generate some future research 
directions with a specific focus on identifying patterns of match-fixing related behavior that 
should be addressed by all FIFA member states and law-enforcement authorities.   
Additionally, an attempt will be made to address match-fixing phenomenon and the 
context of organized crime pattern by looking at different actors, players, referees and club 
owners. Finally, it will explore whether criminological theories can explain individuals’ 
involvement in match-fixing and its prevention having as an ultimate goal the criminalization 
and containment of this phenomenon. To achieve the goals mentioned above, the present study 
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will analyze data gathered from a series of bi-weekly reports compiled by INTERPOL Sports 
Integrity Unit that covers the period from January 2013 until June 2017. 
Finally, it should be noted that the present study does not seek to discuss and address the 
problem of corruption in sport in its totality. Such an analysis would be unrealistic and is beyond 
the scope of this dissertation. We have purposely chosen to focus on match-fixing as the most 
prominent form of corruption based on the literature and previous studies and, as explained 
above, we will attempt to dig deeper into the matter and unveil crucial elements that will offer 
new insight into the problem of match-fixing, as a whole. 
Statement of the problem 
Match manipulation is not a new problem; it has been around for a while, however, over 
the last decade, it is on the rise. In recent years, soccer has been under sustained attack 
worldwide from organized crime, with criminal groups infiltrating clubs and soccer associations 
to entice players, referees and officials “into manipulating the course of a soccer match – 
determining in advance the result or the dynamics of a game.” (Haberfeld & Sheehan, 2014.) 
Referees and players are tempting targets for match-fixers because their decisions can 
significantly alter a game’s outcome. The profits made in fixed games are so vast, in particular 
on the Asian betting market, “that organized crime recently switched from drug trafficking to 
match-fixing” (Hill, 2010) 
That being said, match-fixing threatens the integrity of the sport, has serious political, 
ethical and economic implications and has been described as “the biggest threat to sport in the 
21
st
 century” (Carpenter, 2012) Additionally, match-fixing allows criminals to make huge 
profits. According to some estimates provided by FIFA gambling syndicates that are active in the 
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unregulated Asian gambling market make more than $140 billion per year betting on fixed 
games, compared to just $4 billion that FIFA made in the 2014 World Cup.   
Although match-fixing cases today make the headlines at an unprecedented rate the 
phenomenon itself has been empirically limited and under-theorized (Numerato, 2016). 
Additionally, the lack of primary and up-to-date empirical evidence makes it hard for researchers 
to generalize or draw conclusions from the available studies regarding the scope of the 
phenomenon. Undoubtfully, match-fixing is a topical and requires more attention from 
researchers.  
It is, thus, important to seek ways to make some significant contributions to the field. 
Although the majority of academic studies on match-fixing are qualitative, the proposed study 
will follow a more quantitative path. More specifically, the proposed research will provide an 
account of the current match-fixing landscape utilizing the most up-to-date available data. 
Previous research has not used INTERPOL reports when attempting to understand the scope of 
match-fixing and any available data sets were compiled before 2012. That said, most studies do 
not include the latest, unprecedented, developments or if they do, they provide a purely 
qualitative and testimonial rather than empirical analysis. That said, the current study is the first 
known attempt to collect, codify and analyze data that are made publicly available by 
INTERPOL following a methodologically solid approach.Last but not least, the available body 
of knowledge is limited when it comes to the role of criminal justice/law enforcement 
understanding and interventions in dealing with match-fixing. 
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Conceptualization- match-fixing in context 
 
Despite the increased political and academic interest about match-fixing, especially over 
the last decade- there is no consensus among practitioners and academic on its definition 
(Spapens & Olfers,2015). However, governments and sports associations, including FIFA and 
the United European Soccer Association (UEFA), have highlighted the importance of the 
adoption of a universal definition of match-fixing. Although it could be argued that the 
definitional problem in the case of match-fixing is definitely not as problematic as, for example, 
in the case of a univerally accepted definition of terrorism, a clear definition of match-fixing is 
needed in order to help governments across the globe to introduce harmonized and effective 
legislation. 
  In the literature, various definitions of the phenomenon have been used (Haberfeld, 
2014). Hill (2015) proposed a two-type definition of soccer match-fixing. He argued that a 
distinction should be made between “arranged match-fixing” and “gambling match-fixing.” 
While the former occurs when “corruptors manipulate a soccer match to ensure that one team 
wins or draws the match.” (Hill, 2015), the latter would be the case when corruptors manipulate 
a soccer match with the goal to maximise their profits from gambling, either on a legal or illegal 
gambling platform. Serby (2012), also argued that there are “gradations within match-fixing,” 
however, at the end of the day fixed games mainly involve players “pretending to compete but 
actually deliberately underperforming.” 
For this study, the following comprehensive definition of the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime (2013) will be used: 
“Match-fixing is defined as an arrangement or irregular alteration of 
the course or result of a sporting competition or any of its particular events 
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(e.g., matches, races, etc.) to remove all or part of the uncertainty normally 
associated with competition.” 
It is worth noting that despite the increasing interest in match-fixing, the phenomenon has 
been empirically limited and under-theorized (Numerato, 2016). Additionally, primary and up-
to-date empirical evidence is often missing, and generalizations cannot easily be drawn from the 
conducted studies. Not surprisingly, when the discussion revolves around widespread, the 
phenomenon is, most responses are mainly based on isolated case studies.  
Moreover, it should be noted  
Inclusions and exclusions 
For this dissertation, only studies that approach the problem of match-fixing from a 
criminal justice/criminology angle will be considered. It is acknowledged that the phenomenon 
of match-fixing has been studied by economists as well using economy-based conceptual 
models. However, the presentation and review of the latter are beyond the scope of this 
dissertation. 
Moreover, the literature suggests that “soccer is far from alone in being a target for 
match-fixers” (Carpenter,2012) as incidents of match-fixing have been reported around the world 
in tennis, cricket, basketball, horse racing, etc. (Errede,2009). However, this dissertation will be 
limited to soccer match-fixing cases and will not address match-fixing in other sports. This 
approach is mainly supported by the fact that soccer is second to none when it comes to match-
fixing.  For example, in Europe soccer accounted for 70% of match-fixing cases and 72.2% of 
betting related match-fixing (Gorse & Chadwick, 2011). 
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Chapter 2: Literature review 
 
Research specific to match-fixing is relatively limited and has predominantly evolved 
over the last decade. Although not limited to match-fixing per se, a key reference is a study 
conducted by Brooks, Aleem,& Button(2013) on individual and organizational fraud and 
corruption in sport. It is a pioneering study that provides one of the very few sociological 
accounts of fraud and corruption in sport rather than usual historical one. 
Due to the nature of the phenomenon, the majority of the available studies are qualitative, 
and the tools used include mainly interviews and ethnography. Some quantitative studies are also 
available utilizing statistics and fixed games databases; however, these databases are far from 
comprehensive, and numbers of fixed games often differ from study to study (Borrallo & 
Sánchez, 2012). Some studies that adopt a mixed-methods approach are present as well.  
Regardless, understanding the characteristics and determinants of match-fixing is of great 
potential interest not only to criminologists but also to other social scientists. Firstly, these 
phenomena have a negative impact on the society at large, as sports events keep on reaching 
larger and larger audiences worldwide. For example, soccer is the professional sport that was 
most successful in penetrating the developing world. The South African World Cup was 
broadcasted in some 200 countries with a potential audience of 25 billion persons. The final 
match was watched by some 700 million individuals across the globe. Secondly, the study on 
match-fixing can provide important insights on more general criminal events as well. Indeed, 
some of the mechanisms behind match-fixing and betting are contiguous to other illegal 
activities and often involve criminal organizations operating well beyond the professional sports 
industry. Thirdly, match-fixing is a topic of interest also from a strictly economic point of view, 
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since sports activities contribute to a significant share of GDP, i.e., up to 2 % of EU GDP (Boeri 
& Severgnini, 2012). Several statistics also document the large negative impact of corruption on 
economic activity.  
According to recent studies (Lambsdorff, 2007), every year corruption reduces the level 
of yearly productivity by about 4 % and a country net annual capital inflow by some 0.5 % of 
GDP. Match-rigging, in particular, has a relevant cost for the society. For example, according to 
Interpol Secretary General, Ronald Noble, match-fixing has a value of hundreds of billions of 
Euros per year, a sum which can be compared to the total revenues of Coca-Cola (Fritzpatrick, 
2013). 
Moreover, the literature suggests that “soccer is far from alone in being a target for 
match-fixers” (Carpenter,2012) as incidents of match-fixing have been reported around the world 
in tennis, cricket, basketball, horse racing, etc. (Errede,2009). However, this study will be limited 
to soccer match-fixing cases and will not address match-fixing in other sports, as in Europe for 
example, soccer accounted for 70% of match-fixing cases and 72.2% of betting related match-
fixing (Gorse & Chadwick, 2011). 
Depending on their methodology, available studies are mainly concerned with the following 
areas:  
a) Is match-fixing a local, regional or global phenomenon? 
A review of the available literature reveals that match-fixing is a global phenomenon that is 
not by any means restricted to certain countries of geographical areas. From Asia to Europe and 
from Africa to Russia, soccer match-fixing and corruptions in sports is a major issue for the 
criminal justice system. In May 2013, the European Police Office (EUROPOL) announced that 
about 680 suspicious matches including qualifying games for the World Cup and European 
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Championships, and the Champions League for top European club sides, have been identified in 
an inquiry by European police forces (Van Rompuy, 2013.)  The matches in question were 
played between 2008 and 2011, the investigators said. About 380 of the suspicious matches were 
played in Europe, and a further 300 were identified in Africa, Asia, and Latin America.  
In Italy, for example, where match-fixing is far from a new phenomenon  (Foot, 2007) 
criminal organizations also seem to play an important in role in match-fixing and betting. 
According to media reports, some meetings and phone calls between mafia members and soccer 
players have been taking place. In some cases, members of Camorra apparently asked a soccer 
team manager to exert pressure on doctors in a local hospital to support an illegal trade of organs 
(Saviano 2012). The practice of rigging matches has deep cultural roots; in recent years, more 
precisely in 2006 and in 2011, Italian prosecutors brought to light two different scandals, known 
as Calciopoli and Scommessopoli that involved hundreds of individuals.  
Mulema Mukasa (2013) in his study on soccer corruption in Uganda points out that match-
fixing is the commonest form of corruption in Uganda and this is not specifically restricted to 
soccer. This involves the national Association/Federation, Referees, Coaches/Manager, Clubs 
officials, athletes/players, technical staff, league managers who in one way or the other abuse 
their positions for personal gain or the benefit of the corruptor for varied reasons. As he reveals 
in his study, in 2003, Uganda’s top-tier soccer league, The Super League, ended with about 70 % 
of the games bearing the makings and trappings of match-fixing and corruption.  
Additionally, he found that match-fixing is prevalent in all the five East African countries 
with the most business in Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania, and in the countries of Rwanda and 
Burundi is a nascent industry. This mainly because regulation of sports betting in all the 
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countries is poor and not up to speed with the contemporary sophistication to prevent abuse and 
most especially its effect on the integrity of the sport.  
 Not surprisingly, the long list of countries being affected by match-fixing includes Russia 
as well.  As Cheloukhine (2014) points out soccer championships were accompanied by 
continuous accusations of the total sale of matches and the bribing of referees, club officials, and 
players. Russia seems to represent yet another country where soccer officials diligently delegate 
the responsibility for investigating fixed games to law enforcement agencies which, in turn, do 
not want to interfere since, historically, such investigations were plagued by lack of evidence 
against the perpetrators and reluctant victims. 
 Last but not least, there seems to be a growing consensus in the literature about the global 
nature of match-fixing and to the undeniable fact that Sports bodies, associations, clubs, 
national teams, sports officials and law enforcement agencies today are facing a growing global 
variety of threats and challenges ranging from match-fixing to corruption, illegal betting and use 
of performance and image enhancing drugs in sport. (Borrallo, & Sánchez, 2012; Errede, 2009; 
Feltes,2013; Misra,Anderson, & Saunders, 2013.) 
B) Why and how are soccer games getting fixed? 
A review of the literature suggests that the major motivations behind match manipulation 
include financial gain, money laundering, and future team advantage. (Rebeggiani, 2014; Misra, 
Anderson & Saunders, 2014 ) A few countries, including Italy, have seen an active involvement 
of the Mafia syndicates in match-fixing cases (Boeri &  Severgnini,2014). The two scandals that 
shook the world of soccer- known as Calciopoli and Scommessopoli- involved two types of 
rigging; on the one hand team managers who were active in order to manipulate the outcomes of 
a tournament by altering results of games involving directly or indirectly (e.g., penalizing 
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potential competitors) their team while on the other hand match-fixing occurred in order to 
secure betting results- i.e. huge profits-  for  mafia criminal organizations that were the main 
fixers of the game. In Russia, a study of match-fixing shows that games could be potentially 
fixed either for pure profit –although it seems to be the smallest share- or between club officials 
and club owners, including diving or selling points that include arrangements between two or 
more teams. (Cheloukhine,2014)    
One of the major issues in match-fixing is how corruptors are manipulating games. Hill 
(2009) suggested that the process of match-fixing has five distinct stages which he described as 
access, set-up, calling the fix, performance, and payment. Corruptors face certain difficulties and 
challenges when approaching the players as indicated by 220 interviews that he conducted with 
players and team officials, referees and law-enforcement agencies. These vulnerabilities of 
match-fixers could potentially be used by the law-enforcement to disrupt the process of fixing a 
game at an early stage. However, it should be noted that match-fixing has led to extensive 
corruption in a significant number of countries around the world, with Asian countries being the 
“usual suspects” (Maennig, 2006). As Spapens & Olfers (2015) argue, corruptors “exploit 
financial difficulties of clubs, players and others who can influence the outcome of a match” as 
well as gambling addiction among individuals. 
C)Who are the key players in match-fixing? 
Match-fixing seems to be an activity that involves a series of different “stakeholders.” 
Referees, players, and team officials seem to be the main three groups of individuals that interact 
in the process before, during and even after fixing a game (Hill, 2009).  Players and referees are 
often young and in the public spotlight, lacking experience and dreaming of overnight success; 
inevitably, this creates vulnerability.  However, the chances of delivering a successful fix 
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increase when team officials are actively involved (Hill, 2009) although a deeper understanding 
of the match-fixing phenomenon requires an analysis of the dynamics and interactions between 
players, referees, and fixed sport association officials (Numerato,2016). 
 Interestingly enough, as Manoli & Antonopoulos (2015) found in a qualitative study, 
individuals who are involved in match-fixing many times act on improvisation using rather 
simple structures and not complex schemes. Petropoulos & Maguire (2014) also agreed that team 
owners seem to have a major role in match-fixing cases in Greece. However, they expressed 
their concern that soccer team players are extremely vulnerable to match-fixers and their role in 
match-fixing is more important than most people assume. 
Boeri & Severgnini (2014) argued that not only team managers, referees, and soccer 
players are involved, but also criminal organizations play a major role when it comes to actual 
manipulation of soccer games and the facilitation of corruption.  It also seems that the size of a 
country and the familiarity between soccer officials, administrators  and players plays a 
predominant role in match-fixing; ultimately, the modest stakes involved in domestic 
competitions, all of which possibly render local soccer more prone to experience cases of match-
fixing or other forms of corruption (Aquilina & Chetcuti, 2014.) 
D) How can match-fixing be tackled? 
Rompuy (2014) in his study explores existing national regulations of the European Union 
(EU) member states seeking to manage risks related to the manipulation of sports events and 
views a criminal justice approach as an effective reaction to deal with the phenomenon. 
Although the same approach is endorsed by UNODC (2013), it seems that the lack of uniformity 
of legislation at a global level and very few jurisdictions seem to address the issue of match-
fixing using legal tools effectively. The lack of ad-hoc criminal offenses is one of the major 
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flaws that seriously hamper the efforts of both the law enforcement and the judicial authorities in 
some countries.  
Additionally, the legal toolbox against match-fixing should include a series of other 
“supportive” measures of criminal justice, including but not limited to the following:  
jurisdiction, the liability of legal persons, protection of whistle-blowers, money- laundering, 
confiscation, special investigative techniques, etc. (UNODC,2013).   
While legislation can play an important role in match-fixing prevention, the role of 
bookmakers in tackling the phenomenon is also important (Ferguson, 2014). Technology, 
through online betting, helped match-fixers to expand their illegal activities. However, license 
and legitimate betting companies could potentially benefit extensively from the use of 
technology-assisted sophisticated mathematical models and statistics that help them spot 
suspicious betting on soccer games. Haberfeld and Sheehan (2014) suggest that there are five 
areas involved in combating match manipulation: prevention (awareness raising, education, and 
revision of codes), detection (monitoring), intelligence gathering, investigation (fact-finding) and 
sanctions. 
Last but not least, other suggestions include the use of accreditation, certification, and 
licensing procedures as tools to “reinforce existing compliance initiatives and form part of a 
more comprehensive governance strategy in efforts to help prevent match-fixing” (Jones,2013). 
Most of the studies that focus on law provisions and the criminalization of match-fixing as a 
means of addressing the problem, often lack the theoretical basis that is essential to understand 
the problem of match-fixing. In other words, these studies commit a “fundamental attribution 
error” as they ad-hoc perceive a law-based response as adequate to tackle match-fixing.  
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However, it seems that a “one size fits all” approach when it comes to addressing match-
fixing across the globe has a series of limitations; Moriconi (2016) in his qualitative study of 
match-fixing in Iberian countries that included interviews with key informants and media 
clipping, shows that the preventive and educational messages produced by international 
institutions and sport organizations- especially after the FIFA scandal was revealed in 2015- are 
not particularly useful in Portugal or Spain because they seem to lack awareness of specific local  
discursive variables  and thus they don’t show a holistic awareness of the problem.  
Final thoughts on the literature 
The literature on match-fixing as a criminal justice problem is relatively scarce. Most 
studies are lacking a comprehensive approach, due to the complex nature of the phenomenon. A 
couple of the major studies in the field view criminal law sanctions as the only way to effectively 
respond to the threat of match-fixing; this is an approach that promotes the role of criminal 
legislation as the only tool to unveil match-fixing cases that are currently below the radar due to 
the fact that law enforcement and judicial authorities do not have the tools to fight them. 
Although this is a promising approach, most countries across the globe have failed to introduce 
criminal provisions that address the problem of match-fixing. 
One of the major issues associated with match-fixing is the fact that it is quite often 
covered with a veil of secrecy, so most people who are involved in it either hesitate to speak up 
or they do not fully disclose the truth. Thus, empirical studies are not easy to conduct, and when 
this has been attempted, they are far from comprehensive. As a result, the exact number of cases 
that occur annually across the world is extremely hard to estimate as a certain number of them 
will never be revealed or investigated by the law-enforcement authorities.   
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Also, only a handful of studies has applied criminological theory and research to explore 
the causes of the phenomenon. As thoughtful engagement with the sociological and 
criminological theory is not present, more studies suggest a series of solutions and policy 
implications that are not informed by theory.  Interestingly enough, except one study 
(Voode,2013) an examination of the role of the academia in explaining and addressing the 
problem of match-fixing seems to be absent as well. Nevertheless, most studies agree on an 
alarming lack of empirical research in the field of match-fixing. 
A key finding is that any initiative to address the problem of match-fixing, for example, 
education campaigns or training programs for soccer players to raise awareness for match-fixing, 
should take into consideration both the theoretical background and the findings of the studies that 
have been conducted so far. Failure to do so will result in the effectiveness of these programs to 
be compromised.  
In conclusion, one could argue that although there is no consensus that an approach to match-
fixing that is based solely on legislative measures can be considered effective, however, it is 
extremely likely that a response to the match-fixing problem that lacks a solid and coherent 
legislative component will be far from comprehensive.   
 
Chapter 3: The study 
Objectives of the study 
The present study has a series of objectives, as listed below:  
Objective 1: To identify how extensive is the involvement of players in match-fixing. 
Objective 2: To identify how extensive is the involvement of referees in match-fixing. 
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Objective 3: To identify how extensive is the involvement of organized crime in match-fixing. 
Objective 4: To identify how extensive is the involvement of club officials in match-fixing. 
Objective 5: To identify how extensive is the involvement of others in match-fixing. 
Objective 6: To identify and compare the scope of the phenomenon in countries where these 
behaviors are already criminalized vs. those that still lack the legal toolbox to address the 
phenomenon. 
    Objective 7: To establish whether there is a relationship between the existence and severity of 
sanction and the scope of the match-fixing related behavior. 
  Objective 8: Based on the research findings suggest some policy recommendations with a focus 
on suppression and enforcement. 
Research questions 
Many different questions emerging from the literature soccer match-fixing have informed 
and, eventually,  influenced the research questions of the current study. Given the complexity of 
the phenomenon, the interaction between organized crime syndicates and soccer club officials, 
the tempting nature of illegal betting and, ultimately, the need for an effective law -enforcement 
response a series of questions were developed that are very important to meet the goals of the 
proposed dissertations.  
RQ. 1: What is the scope of the match-fixing phenomenon around the world? 
This question will explore whether match-fixing is as serious as it is portrayed to be by 
various mass media and various academic and non-academic outlets/forums. Assessing the scope 
of the phenomenon is critical regarding understanding match-fixing, put it in context and propose 
some policies to address or/and contain it, 
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RQ. 2: How serious is the involvement of different stakeholders in match-fixing cases? 
As this is a complex phenomenon, various individuals are involved along with organized 
crime syndicates. 
RQ.3: Is there a relationship between the existence of legal provisions and the number of 
cases that are unveiled by the law-enforcement authorities? 
This set of research questions is important to assess who are the main actors in match-fixing 
cases and how they operate. 
RQ. 4: Are there countries where these behaviors are already criminalized- either as 
misdemeanors or felonies? 
Assessing which countries are more prone and susceptible to sports corruption and match-
fixing will help the international community as well as the local and regional law-enforcement 
organization to narrow down their efforts to those countries that operate as a fertile ground for 
soccer corruptors. Additionally, custom-made responses will become more feasible.  
RQ. 5: Is there a relationship between the severity of sanction and the scope of the 
behavior? 
Addressing match-fixing cases and eventually securing of the integrity of soccer is directly 
related to the effectiveness of the sanction in place. Thus, assessing the relationship between 
those sanctions and the scope of the behavior is essential. 
RQ.6: Is there is a relationship between high levels of corruption and occurrence of 
match-fixing? 
In the majority of cases, high levels of corruption in a given country quite often co-exist with 
low socio-economic status (Maeda & Ziefeld, 2015). Inevitably, soccer players who live and 
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work in said conditions are subject to strain due to low salaries, low trust in other members of 
society and the government and, thus, susceptible to the tempting offers of match-fixers.  
.  
Chapter four: Theoretical framework 
A deeper understanding of match-fixing requires the introduction of a theoretical 
framework, utilizing criminological theories. Although the current research is exploratoryy its 
theoretical framework draws mainly from criminological theories that include Differential 
Association, Routine Activity, and Strain theory:  
Differential Association theory  
This theory of crime and delinquency developed by Edwin Sutherland is a social learning 
theory that holds that criminality is the result of engaging in inappropriate behaviors exhibited by 
those with whom we interact (Sutherland, Cressey, & Luckenbill,1995). His theory gives priority 
to the power of social influences and learning experiences and can be expressed regarding a 
series of propositions, that can be summarized as follows : (Sutherland, & Cressey, 1984) 
1. Criminal behavior is learned in interaction with other persons in the process of 
communication. 
2. That learning takes place primarily in intimate personal groups and includes not only the 
techniques of committing a crime but the motives, rationalizations, and attitudes which 
accompany crime. 
 19 
 
3. Differential associations may vary in frequency, duration, priority, and intensity, and a 
person becomes delinquent because of an excess of definitions favorable to violation of law over 
definitions unfavorable to violation of the law. 
4. The learning process involves the same mechanisms whether a person is learning 
criminality or conformity. 
One famous application of this theory in the area of corruption in sports is the case of the 
renowned doper in cycling, Lance Armstrong, who would supply banned substances to his 
teammates who then would adopt his cheating attitude to win at no costs. If a new cyclist was to 
join the team, they either had to adopt the same attitude as others in the team or risk being 
replaced (United States Anti-Doping Agency, 2012)   
In their study, Spapens& Olfers (2015) found that one of the primary factors that 
contribute to match-fixing is the development of social relations of persons involved in sports 
with criminals. This interaction is described as one of the main “risk factors” and is consistent 
with differential association theory main propositions. 
Routine Activity theory 
The routine activity theory (RAT) is an opportunity-based framework that suggests that a 
Crime occurs when the following three factors exist: a motivated offender, who is the 
individual looking to commit a crime; the availability of a suitable target, which is the “thing” 
the motivated offender is aiming for; and the absence of a capable guardian, who is any person or 
object which acts as a crime deterrent (Cohen & Felson, 1979). According to RAT, crime occurs 
when a motivated offender and a suitable target come together in space and time while in the 
absence of a capable guardian (Cohen & Felson, 1979).  
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Routine Activity Theory triangle, retrieved from Australian Institute of Criminology-  http://www.aic.gov.au. 
 
Peurala (2013) examined betting-motivated corruption in sport and illegal betting from 
the RAT perspective. A motivated offender has a range of opportunities through online sports 
betting, where the risk of getting caught can increase when a match is fixed, and a noticeable bet 
is made using a regulated bookmaker in the same jurisdiction. However, the risk of being caught 
decreases when a bet is placed with an unregulated bookmaker on a fixed match (Peurala, 2013). 
As Peurala (2013), points out: 
The occasions for criminals have never been greater than today. Sports betting on the 
internet offers criminals various opportunities and large sums of money are involved. 
When matches are manipulated in different countries, and betting takes place on the 
internet, the risks for criminals getting caught are not great. (Peurala, 2013,p. 273) 
 
However, while there is literature examining RAT against a range of different crimes, there 
is limited discussion surrounding its application in understanding soccer match-fixing. Under 
such a model, the size of a bribe and a probability of a successful fix are likely to be weighed 
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against the likelihood of detection and the penalty if caught, as well as feelings of guilt and the 
potential for blame by teammates for underperformance. Such theorizing points towards the need 
to identify situational crime prevention measure through which to deny or reduce the opportunity 
for corrupt behavior. Law enforcement agencies, sporting organizations, gambling industry 
bodies and betting operators should, according to the propositions of routine activity theory, get 
actively involved in reducing the opportunity for match-fixing to occur.    
Strain Theory  
The cause of an individual’s corrupt behavior can be explained by the classical strain 
theory proposed by Merton (1968), who argued that the reason behind criminal behavior is due 
to pressures in society; in particular, the social structure of the American culture places increased 
importance on achieving economic stability and that an individual can either conform to this 
culture or deviate from the norm and attain this goal through criminal behavior. However, 
Agnew (1992) introduced a broader version of the classical strain theory, the general strain 
theory (GST). Agnew and Brezina (2010) contend that GST is a contemporary and more general 
approach to the classical strain theory, proposing that a broad range of strains contribute to 
criminal behavior. Strains can be described as situations that are disliked by an individual.  
There are three categories of strain: failing to attain positively valued goals, motivations 
that are positive, and the presentation of motivations that are negative (Agnew, 1992). Strains 
can intensify, negatively affecting an individual by causing them to feel anger and frustration. To 
ease these negative feelings caused by straining the individual resorts to criminal behavior 
because legitimate approaches fail to reinforce positive emotions. While it is evident there is an 
already established emphasis in the current literature on addressing adolescent criminal behavior 
(Baron, 2007; Ostrowsky & Messner, 2005; Paternoster & Mazerolle, 1994) there is a gap in 
 22 
 
knowledge surrounding the application of GST within the context of sports corruption and soccer 
match-fixing, in particular. 
Forest et al .(2008) highlight that the manipulation of sporting events is more likely to 
take place when athletes are poorly paid or if their salary level is regarded as unjust. A  FIFPro 
study (2012) indicates that corruptors target players whose clubs fail to pay their salary or 
bonuses on time. The research found that 55 of respondents who had been approached to 
consider fixing a match were not paid their salary on time, while 59,2 percent of players 
approached were not paid their bonuses on time. The report concluded that: “Players who do not 
receive their salaries are very vulnerable to becoming involved in match-fixing. The longer the 
salary is in arrears, the greater the risk that the player will respond to requests to participate in 
manipulating matches.”     
As Merton’s (1968)  strain theory indicates, athletes or officials who are unable to 
achieve their financial goals through legitimate means may innovate, with betting-related 
manipulation of sporting events a means through which they can achieve their goal of wealth 
creation. Thus, for some athletes “the risk of getting caught is outweighed by the possibility of 
the riches promised by the gambler” (Goodfellow, 2005,p.25).  Hill (20015) also shares this view 
and suggested that the decision of a soccer player to accept a bribe and participate in a fixed 
game is explained by strain theory.  Regardless of their current successful status, players are 
under strain in their careers as they are thinking about the near-future. When they are towards the 
end, or they finish their career “they may be in a situation of anomie – no career, relatively 
uneducated and little opportunity to maintain both the status and pay that they enjoyed as 
players” (Hill, 2015). 
 23 
 
Chapter 5: Methodology 
As mentioned earlier, the data used for this study include some weekly and biweekly 
qualitative reports published by INTERPOL. Thus, the present dissertation will utilize the tools 
of secondary data analysis and quantification of qualitative data to pursue its objectives and test a 
series of hypotheses. 
 Data  
The data that will be analyzed in this study have been collected through INTERPOL’s 
website and include biweekly reports of sport-related corruption cases across the globe. These 
reports contain information from open sources- mainly from mass media- which are categorized 
depending on the geographical region that the match-fixing incident was reported. The reports 
cover the years from 2013 until  mid-2017 and access to them are free to individuals who sign up 
for INTERPOL’s newsletter. INTERPOL’s Corruption in Sports unit has the authority to decide 
whether access to the newsletter is granted and the organization reserves the right to reject an 
individual access request without prior warning. 
 Based on INTERPOL’s strategy to prevent match-fixing, the Integrity in Sports unit 
delivers a wide range of information, guidance, training, services, and expertise to key partners 
developing their sports integrity initiatives. (Abbott & Sheehan, 2013). That said, as part of their 
mandate to raise awareness of contemporary issues related to match-fixing in soccer, the 
INTERPOL Integrity in Sports unit compiles a weekly overview of the main stories in the media 
related to current investigations, sanctions and sentences, illegal betting and best practices. More 
details about the collection methodology are not known. However, following a series of 
communications via email with the Unit’s analysts it is assumed that the vast majority of 
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English-speaking media around the world are monitored, and the all match-fixing related cases 
are recorded effectively. 
 A second data set created by Husting, Iglesias,& Kern (2012), that includes the criminal 
law provisions in EU 27 that pertain to match-fixing will be utilized. This dataset will be used to 
compare the countries where these behaviors are already criminalized to those that still lack a 
similar legal toolbox. For countries that are included in the bi-weekly reports and are not 
members of the EU, a UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) report along open 
sources were used to identify the current legislative landscape with regards to match-fixing. The 
vast majority of the countries that are researched in this study have made their criminal 
legislation publicly available, so the number of “missing values”(i.e., countries for which we did 
not manage to collect criminal law data) is significantly law. 
 Finally, the Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) published by Transparency International 
(TI) since 1996 will also be used.This index is used to rank countries "by their perceived levels 
of corruption, as determined by expert assessments and opinion surveys" (Lambsdorff, 2000) 
and will be utilized to construct the “corruption” variable. 
 
Secondary data analysis 
Secondary data analysis is usually referred to as “analysis of data collected by someone 
else” (Boslaugh, 2007) and “includes any data that are examined to answer a research question 
other than the question(s) for which the data were initially collected” (Vartanian, 2010). This 
approach is not new; secondary analysis of existing datasets was and remains central to 
criminological research - 58 percent of the studies in the fields of criminology and criminal 
studies used secondary data analysis according to Kleck, Tark, & Bellows (2006).  
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Secondary analysis involves the use of existing data, collected “for a prior study, in order 
to pursue a research interest which is distinct from that of the original work; this may be a new 
research question or an alternative perspective on the original question” (Hinds, Vogel and 
Clarke-Steffen 1997, Szabo and Strang 1997). In this respect, secondary analysis differs from 
systematic reviews and meta-analyses of qualitative studies which aim instead to compile and 
assess the evidence relating to a common concern or area of practice (Popay, Rogers and 
Williams,1998). Secondary analysis can involve the use of single or multiple qualitative data 
sets, as well as mixed qualitative and quantitative data sets. Moreover, the approach may either 
be employed by researchers to re-use their data or by independent analysts using previously 
established qualitative data sets. 
One of the major advantages of secondary data analysis is that, because the data have 
already been collected by a third party, it requires fewer resources (e.g., time, money) than 
primary data collection. Also, the advent of software to aid the coding, retrieval, and analysis of 
qualitative data is another development which is likely to facilitate both the archiving and 
availability of qualitative data for secondary analysis purposes. In sum, the secondary analysis 
provides an opportunity to expand our understanding of the nature, consequences, and responses 
of corruption in soccer and, in particular, match-fixing. 
However, before proceeding with using secondary data analysis, it is essential to establish 
that there is a compatibility of the data with secondary analysis: in other words, “are the data 
amenable to secondary analysis? This will depend on the 'fit' between the purpose of the analysis 
and the nature and quality of the original data” (Thorne 1994). The scope for additional in-depth 
analysis will vary depending on the nature of the data; in our case, the reports used for the 
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analysis will be quantified to secure both the compatibility of the data with the secondary data 
analysis as well safeguard the validity and reliability of the study.  
 
Quantification of the data 
As the reports are predominantly qualitative -secondary data can be both qualitative and 
quantitative-  it is essential to quantify the available data to be able to analyze it and draw 
conclusions. In other words, as Green (2001) describes it, “to turn words and images into 
numbers.” That said, the process of conducting a quantitative analysis of qualitative data will 
include three main steps: First, organize the data; second, read it and code it and third, and then 
present and interpret it. (Green, 2001). 
One of the most common tools for quantification of qualitative data is thematic analysis, 
as it considered as a flexible, accessible tool that researchers use to quantify qualitative data.  
In cases like the present study where the collected data are completely qualitative thematic 
analysis can be utilized to identify important or frequent themes from the data. In this context, a 
theme is something important about the data about the research question, which represents some 
level of meaning within the data set.  
 The steps that are commonly used to conduct a comprehensive thematic analysis are as 
follows (Braun & Clarke, 2006): 
Familiarize yourself with the data: This requires the repeated reading of 
the available data. It’s important to scrutinize the text to ensure that patterns or 
meanings are not overlooked. 
 27 
 
Note any patterns: After reading the data, make a list of the contents of the 
data and its salient features. All visible patterns or features should be taken into 
account. 
Search for themes: Once you’ve noted all potential patterns, look for 
possible ways to group them into themes. 
Review the themes: Look back at the data to check how valid your themes 
are. Be sure to check if sufficient data is available for each theme if the themes 
are varied, and if the data within each theme is homogenous. If the observations 
under a single theme are too varied, the theme classification is not appropriate. 
Define and name themes: Now that your themes are set, define them. At this 
stage, the list of themes should be a proper map of the information — the 
themes should describe the main points contained in the reports without 
overlapping in meaning.  
Analyze the data: Categorize individual words or phrases from the 
qualitative data into their appropriate themes. These themes can then be 
analyzed statistically. 
 
Variables used in the present study 
Based on an analysis of the reports which was informed by the existing literature on match-
fixing, the following variables have been identified and will be used in the present dissertation: 
a) Countries where match-fixing cases have occurred during the years that are covered by 
the available data. 
b) Actors involved in match-fixing incident(s). The actors include the following: players,  
referees, club owners, organized crime groups and others. 
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c) Presence or absence of legal definition that criminalizes the phenomenon; moreover, 
in countries case match-fixing is criminalized as a phenomenon, whether there is a 
specialized law in place or the main legal tool is generic criminal law provisions. 
d) The Economic and political situation of the country, based on the Transparency 
International Corruption index. In short, this variable will be referred to as 
“corruption.” 
e) The severity of sanctions in place at a given country/region. (i.e.whether existing law 
provisions include imprisonment or lack thereof). 
 
In the ANOVA chapter that follows, the presence or absence of legislative measures along 
with the severity of sanction -where available- 
Operationalization of  Variables  
 Operationalization for this research project’s variables is informed mainly by the existing 
literature on match-fixing, the theoretical framework as well as the databases used for this study. 
The variables that will be utilized in this study are listed below: 
 
Country: The first variable is the country where the match-fixing case(s) has/have been 
recorded. The region where this country is located will be included as well; the regions include 
Europe, Asia, N.America, S. America, Africa, Oceania. 
 Corruption Index: It refers to the economic and political situation of the country; it is a 
categorical variable with three categories based on Transparency International  Corruption Index; 
in line with the methodology followed by TI, countries that score between 0 and 30 will be 
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considered as “very corrupted”, between 31 and  50  “moderate corruption”, between 51 and 70 
as “low corruption” and above 71 as “very little corruption”.  
Match-fixing cases where the player(s) was/were involved:  This is a discrete variable 
that will include the number of match-fixing cases that occur, both per country and in total and 
involves players.  
Match-fixing cases where referee(s) was/were involved:  This is a discrete variable that 
will include the number of match-fixing cases that occur, both per country and in total and 
involves referees. 
Match-fixing cases where coaches(s) was/were involved:  This is a discrete variable 
that will include the number of match-fixing cases that occur, both per country and in total and 
involve coaches. 
Match-fixing cases where soccer club(s) was/were involved:  This is a discrete variable 
that will include the number of match-fixing cases that occur, both per country and in total and 
involve soccer clubs. 
Match-fixing cases where the organized crime was involved:  This is a discrete 
variable that will include the number of match-fixing cases that occur, both per country and in 
total and involve organized crime. This variable will include any activity that is characterized by 
the country’s law enforcement officials as “organized crime”  or “organized crime syndicates.” 
Match-fixing cases where other(s) was/were involved:  This is a discrete variable that 
will include the number of match-fixing cases that occur, both per country and in total and 
involve another actor such as bookmakers, political figures, etc. 
Legislative background: This is a categorical variable that includes three categories. 
That is, countries that have not adopted any legislative measures against match-fixing (“none”), 
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those that use criminal law provisions to address the phenomenon (“criminal code”) and, last but 
not least, countries that have introduced specialized legislation specifically for match-fixing 
crimes (“specialized legislation”). 
Penalty Severity: This variable will include two categories (categorical variable): 
Countries where penalties for match-fixing include imprisonment or imprisonment and monetary 
fines combined vs. those countries where match-fixing violators face no imprisonment or face 
only monetary sanctions. 
 
 Statistical tools  
As outlined above, the present study includes the following variables: A variable about 
the country where match-fixing cases have occurred, six variables measuring the role of the 
actors engaged in match-fixing  (that is, players, coaches, club officials, referees, organised 
crime networks and others)  one variable measuring the presence or absence of legal definition 
that criminalises match-fixing as a behaviour, one variable measuring the corruption level of 
each country and a last one that measures the severity of the sanctions that apply to match-fixing. 
 
Testing the relationship between the variables 
As mentioned in the introduction, this study is exploratory. Thus, to explore the 
relationships between the variables, test a series of hypotheses and, ultimately, answer the 
research questions that were laid out earlier in this study we will use both descriptive and 
inferential statistics. First off, the use of descriptive statistics will help us describe the 
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relationships between the variables of our study; these tools include measures of central tendency 
as well as the distribution of our sample.(Pagano, 2004) 
Second, inferential statistics will serve as the primary tool to test our hypotheses (Hinkle, 
D., Wiersma, W., & Jurs, S.,2003). In this respect, T-test and ANOVA (Analysis of Variance) 
will be carried out. As the use of the appropriate statistics is essential for a reliable and valid 
research, this study was carefully designed having in mind that “bad statistics lead to bad 
research 99% of the time”.(Fitzgerald & Fitzgerald, 2014).  
All statistical tests and subsequent analysis for this dissertation will be conducted using 
the SPSS Statistics version 15.0 for Windows (Green & Salkind,2010), available online through 
the CUNY/Graduate Center’s  portal.  
Research hypotheses  
 The research hypotheses that were tested in the context of the present study are as 
follows: 
H1: Countries where legal definitions have been adopted, and criminal sanctions are in 
place are more likely to effectively address the phenomenon of match-fixing and arrest the 
individuals involved. 
H2: Countries that rank high in the corruption index will have more chances to unveil 
match-fixing cases only if they have adopted criminal sanctions against match-fixers.  
H3:  The severity of criminal sanctions has a relationship with the number of match-
fixing cases that are investigated across the board. 
H4: Organized crime syndicates are involved in match-fixing in countries where 
criminalization of the phenomenon is not in place. 
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H5: Players, soccer officials as well as referees are more likely to engage in match-fixing 
in countries that are ranked as “most corrupted.” 
 
Ethical Concerns  
There are not any ethical considerations/concerns that must be acknowledged in this 
study. The research complies with the IRB guidelines.-  According to Ms. Lynda Mules, MLA, 
Associate Director of Research Compliance at John Jay College of Criminal Justice:  
“The research you’ve described does not involve interaction or intervention with research 
participants, or analysis of identifiable, private information about individuals; as such, the work 
you’ve described does not constitute research with human subjects, and submission to the CUNY 
HRPP/IRB is not required.” 
The data used in this study were retrieved from open sources, and no information from 
human subjects will be collected for this research. As the data that will be used are publicly 
available, there are no issues of consent and confidentiality associated with primary research. 
However, every possible effort will be made to handle all information used in the proposed 
research as well as the results of the research honestly, openly and without bias. 
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Chapter Six: Results from the data analysis 
Overview- how extensive is match fixing? 
 Table 1 presents an overview of the countries where match-fixing cases occurred from 
2013 until June 2017. In total, there were 313 cases recorded by INTERPOL and 81 countries 
investigated one or more cases with the average number of cases per country being 3,86 (mean).  
The total number of both the countries involved and the match-fixing actual cases 
demonstrates the extent of the phenomenon and confirms the findings of the UNODC(2013) that 
“there is virtually no country that could claim it is immune to match-fixing.” 
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Table 1- Match Fixing Cases 2013-
2017   
N 
Valid 81 
Missing 0 
Mean 3,86 
Median 2,00 
Mode 1 
Std. Deviation 4,321 
Variance 18,669 
Minimum 1 
Maximum 22 
Sum 313 
  
  
 
Graph 1  presents the distribution of match-fixing cases from 2013 until June 2017. In 
total, 313 cases were investigated across the globe. The distribution is skewed with the majority 
of countries investigating between 1 and 8 cases and significantly fewer countries reporting more 
than ten cases. The maximum number of cases unveiled in one country was 22 (Spain)followed 
by Singapore with 20 reported cases. However, both countries should be treated as an exception; 
it is what we call in statistics” an outlier,” an observation that is distant from other 
cases/observations. 
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           Graph 1-Distribution of match-fixing cases from 2013-2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Chart 1 and Table 2  present the number of countries that have reported at least one 
match-fixing case per region along with the total number of cases per region. Not surprisingly, 
the vast majority of match-fixing cases occur in countries in Europe and Asia; both regions 
combined account for 66,7% of the total number of countries that are involved in the 
phenomenon. On the contrary, as shown in table 2, only one country from South America has 
dealt with match-fixing investigations despite the fact that soccer, introduced in Brazil in 1894, is 
the most popular sport in South America and has taken “a pivotal role in society” (Giulianotti, 
2012). 
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Additionally, 154 cases, nearly 50% of the total number of reported cases, occurred in 
Europe followed by Asia with 72. Europe and Asia combined, account for nearly two-thirds of 
the total number of reported match-fixing cases. 
 
 
Table 2- Match-fixing cases (countries) by region 
 
Frequenc
y 
Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
AFRICA 16 19,8 19,8 19,8 
ASIA 17 21,0 21,0 40,7 
EUROPE 37 45,7 45,7 86,4 
NORTH 
AMERICA 
9 11,1 11,1 97,5 
OCEANIA 1 1,2 1,2 98,8 
53
72
154
18 13 3
313
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
Africa Asia Europe North
America
Oceania South
America
Total
Chart 1 - Number of match fiixing cases per region
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SOUTH 
AMERICA 
1 1,2 1,2 100,0 
Total 81 100,0 100,0 
 
 
The dominance of European and Asian countries in unveiled match-fixing cases can be 
seen in graph two as well. 
 Graph 2- Frequency of match-fixing cases by region 
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Who are the main actors involved in match-fixing? 
As far as the involvement of different actors is concerned, tables 3-8 present some 
detailed descriptive statistics the involvement of coaches, players, referees, club officials, 
organized crime or others in match-fixing cases. Each of the tables will be analyzed separately, 
accompanied by a graph that visualizes the frequency of the cases per variable (actor). 
Table 3 displays the number of countries that have or have not reported match-fixing 
cases involving coaches. Interestingly enough, 63 out of the 81 countries that are included in our 
dataset have not investigated a single case involving a soccer team coach. Moreover, 13 
countries reported one case, one country reported two cases, three countries reported three cases 
and only one country reported 7 cases of fixed games in which one or more coaches were 
investigated. In sum, more than three quarters (77,8%) of the countries in our database did not 
have any match-fixing case where a coach was involved. 
 
Table 3- Match-fixing cases where COACH(ES) was/were involved 
Valid 
0 63 77,8 77,8 77,8 
1 13 16,0 16,0 93,8 
2 1 1,2 1,2 95,1 
3 3 3,7 3,7 98,8 
7 1 1,2 1,2 100,0 
Total 
81 100,
0 
100,0  
 
 Graph 3 shows the frequency distribution of the cases where coaches were involved. 
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    Graph 3- Distribution of cases where COACH(ES) was/were involved 2013-2017  
 
 According to Table 4, from 2013 until June 2017 an average of 2,02 cases involving 
players was reported by each of the 81 countries that are included in our sample. Of course, if we 
take a close look at graph four we could notice that there is a relatively small number of outliers- 
that is, countries that have reported either a much higher or much lower number of cases that 
involve players. For example, one country (Spain) has reported 13 cases while 26 countries did 
not report any case where one or more players was/were investigated. 
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Table 4- Match Fixing Cases where 
PLAYER(S) was/were involved 2013-2017 
 
N 
Valid 81 
Missing 0 
Mean 2,02 
Median 1,00 
Mode 0 
Std. Deviation 2,725 
Variance 7,424 
Minimum 0 
Maximum 13 
Sum 164 
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    Graph 4- Distribution of cases where PLAYER(S) was/were involved 2013-2017 
 As far as the involvement of referees is concerned, Table 5 reveals that more than three-
quarters of our sample have not investigated cases where one or more referees was/were 
involved, that is 61 out of the 81 countries. Moreover, 13 countries reported one case that 
involved a referee; two countries reported 2 cases and only five countries have investigated 3 
cases-that is, 6,2% of the countries in our sample. 
 Last but not least, Graph 5 provides a depiction of this skewed distribution of cases that 
involve referees. 
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Table 5- Match Fixing Cases where REFEREE(S) 
was/were involved 2013-2017 
 Frequ
ency 
Perc
ent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulati
ve Percent 
Valid 
0 61 75,3 75,3 75,3 
1 13 16,0 16,0 91,4 
2 2 2,5 2,5 93,8 
3 5 6,2 6,2 100,0 
Total 
81 100,
0 
100,0  
 
    Graph 5- Distribution of cases where REFEREE(S) was/were involved 2013-2017 
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 Soccer clubs seem to be more likely to appear in match-fixing compared to referees; 
according to the results presented in Table 6, 54,3% of the countries in our sample have reported 
one or more match-fixing cases where soccer clubs were under investigation. However, 38,3% of 
the countries have reported either one or two cases, and only 16% have reported more than two 
with two countries – Greece and Spain-reporting 8 and 9 cases respectively. 
 
Table 6- Match Fixing Cases where SOCCER CLUBS(S) 
was/were involved 2013-2017 
 Frequ
ency 
Perc
ent 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulati
ve Percent 
Valid 
0 37 45,7 45,7 45,7 
1 20 24,7 24,7 70,4 
2 11 13,6 13,6 84,0 
3 6 7,4 7,4 91,4 
4 3 3,7 3,7 95,1 
6 2 2,5 2,5 97,5 
8 1 1,2 1,2 98,8 
9 1 1,2 1,2 100,0 
     
Total 
81 100,
0 
100,0  
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Graph 6- Distribution of cases where SOCCER CLUB(S) was/were involved 2013-2017 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the literature, organized crime has often been cited as a major actor in match-fixing.  
However, this does not seem to be the case in our sample, at least not to the extent that 
qualitative research has claimed. Looking at the numbers in Table 7, nearly two-thirds of the 
countries have not reported a single case that involves organized crime networks/syndicates.That 
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is, 80,2% of our sample. This skewed distribution of cases where organized crime networks were 
involved can be  seen in Graph 7. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 7- Distribution of 
cases where organized crime 
was involved 2013-2017 
 
Table 7- Match Fixing Cases where  ORGANISED CRIMEwas  
involved 2013-2017 
 
 
 
Frequency Percent Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
0 65 80,2 80,2 80,2 
1 12 14,8 14,8 95,1 
2 2 2,5 2,5 97,5 
5 1 1,2 1,2 98,8 
7 1 1,2 1,2 100,0 
Total 81 100,0 100,0 
 
 46 
 
 
  
Our final table presents the statistics that pertain to the cases where other actors were 
involved in match-fixing. Other(s) include betting companies, bookmakers, local political 
figures, etc. Interestingly enough, 43,2% of the countries in our sample investigated at least one 
case where other(s) were involved. Last but not least, Graph 8 provides a visual representation of 
the distribution of the cases mentioned above. 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 8- Match Fixing Cases where OTHER(S) was/were involved 2013-
2017 
 Frequency Perce
nt 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Valid 
0 46 56,8 56,8 56,8 
1 20 24,7 24,7 81,5 
2 3 3,7 3,7 85,2 
3 6 7,4 7,4 92,6 
4 5 6,2 6,2 98,8 
9 1 1,2 1,2 100,0 
Total 81     100,0 100,0 
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           Graph 8- Distribution of cases where OTHER(S was/were involved 2013-2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Is match-fixing more prevalent in the most corrupted countries? 
 Table 9 provides us with some info regarding the level of corruption of the countries in 
our sample. The average of the corruption index is 50,11-which falls right in between moderate 
and low corruption based on the operationalization of the corruption variable. However, there is 
a significant variation in the corruption index among the 81 countries of our sample. The most 
corrupted country has a corruption index of 21,33 while the less corrupted scores a 91, which 
indicates a country that is almost corruption-free. To visualize the distribution of corruption 
levels, we should consult Graph 9 below.According to the graph, despite the fact that the median 
of our sample equals 50,11 the majority of the countries in our sample have achieved a score 
well below 50 which demonstrates levels of higher corruption with almost 30 countries scoring 
below 40. 
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That said, we could argue that the majority of the countries in our sample demonstrate 
relatively high levels of corruption.However, this is just an observation based on descriptive 
statistics. Whether this is a statistically significant finding will be tested when we run inferential 
statistics. 
Table 9- Corruption Index 
Average 2014-2016 
 
N 
Valid 79 
Missin
g 
2 
Mean 50,1148 
Median 45,2500 
Mode 25,33
a
 
Std. Deviation 19,68193 
Variance 387,378 
Minimum 21,33 
Maximum 91,00 
Sum 3959,07 
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Graph 9- Distribution of corruption Index Average 2013-2016 
 
 
 
Legislative background 
 
Table 10 along with graph ten below show that almost 4 in 10 countries in our sample 
have not implemented any legislative measures to address the problem of match-fixing.This 
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observation is consistent with the findings of several reports in the literature that emphasize on 
the lack of legislation as a loophole that fixers take advantage of (UNODC, 2013). Moreover, 
41,8% of the countries have passed specialized legislation to fight match-fixing while 17,7% of 
the countries rely on criminal law provisions as a tool against the phenomenon. 
 
 Table 10-Legislative Background 
 Frequenc
y 
Percen
t 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulati
ve Percent 
Valid 
None 32 39,5 40,5 40,5 
Criminal 
Code 
14 17,3 17,7 58,2 
Specialised 
Code 
33 40,7 41,8 100,0 
Total 79 97,5 100,0  
Missing 999 2 2,5   
Total 81 100,0   
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                                         Graph 10- Legislative Background 
 
Penalty severity among the countries 
Table 11-Penalty Severity 
 
Freque
ncy 
Perce
nt 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Vali
d 
No 
Imprisonment 
52 64,2 66,7 66,7 
Imprisonment 26 32,1 33,3 100,0 
Total 78 96,3 100,0 
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Miss
ing 
999 
3 3,7 
  
Total 81 100,0 
  
 
 
Table 11 and Graph 11 shows an interesting finding that has been pointed out by some 
studies in the literature; the fact that in the majority of the countries across the globe- two-thirds 
of the countries in our sample- the penalties for match-fixing perpetrators do not include 
imprisonment. Only 32,1% of the countries have opted in for imprisonment as a way of 
punishment for match-fixing plots. 
 
Graph 11- Frequency of Penalty Severity 
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Do countries with anti-match-fixing legislation have more cases unveiled? 
 
 Table 12 and graph show the difference in the average number of cases investigated by 
countries, based on the absence or presence of legislative measures. In particular, it seems that 
countries with specialized legislation have investigated an average of  6 cases from 2013 until 
June 2017, compared to 4 investigated by countries that use only the criminal code. Countries 
that have no legislation in place whatsoever have unveiled only two cases on average. 
Interestingly enough, those countries seem to score low on the corruption index as well; in other 
words, more corrupted countries seem to lack the legal tools and subsequently investigate fewer 
match-fixing cases. The latter is a hypothesis that will be tested later on when T-test and 
ANOVA will be conducted.  
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Table 12- Number of cases depending on Legislative Background 
 Legislative Background 
None Criminal 
Code 
Specialised 
Code 
Mean Mean Mean 
Match Fixing Cases 
2013-2017 
2 4 6 
Match Fixing Cases 
where COACH(ES) 
was/were involved 2013-
2017 
0 0 1 
Match Fixing Cases 
where PLAYER(S) was/were 
involved 2013-2017 
1 2 3 
Match Fixing Cases 
where REFEREE(S) 
was/were involved 2013-
2017 
0 0 1 
Match Fixing Cases 
where SOCCER CLUBS(S) 
was/were involved 2013-
2017 
1 1 2 
Match Fixing Cases 
where ORGANISED CRIME 
was involved 2013-2017 
0 0 1 
Match Fixing Cases 
where OTHER(S) was/were 
involved 2013-2017 
0 1 1 
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Corrupttion Index 
Average 2014-2016 
42,90 59,21 52,13 
 
        Graph 12- Mean of match-fixing cases depending on Legislative Background 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Do countries with tougher legislation have more match-fixing cases unveiled? 
 The statistics in table 13 and Graph 13 support the hypothesis that countries that use 
imprisonment as a form of punishment for match-fixing have more cases unveiled. More 
specifically, the average number of cases per country that enforces imprisonment is five 
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compared to 3 cases in countries that do not do so. However, this is just an initial observation 
based on descriptive statistics and will be tested later on. 
 
 
Table 13- Number of cases depending on Penalty Severity 
 Penalty Severity 
No 
Imprisonment 
Imprisonme
nt 
Mean Mean 
Match Fixing Cases 
2013-2017 
3 5 
Match Fixing Cases 
where COACH(ES) 
was/were involved 2013-
2017 
0 1 
Match Fixing Cases 
where PLAYER(S) was/were 
involved 2013-2017 
2 3 
Match Fixing Cases 
where REFEREE(S) 
was/were involved 2013-
2017 
0 0 
Match Fixing Cases 
where SOCCER CLUBS(S) 
was/were involved 2013-
2017 
1 2 
Match Fixing Cases 
where ORGANISED CRIME 
was involved 2013-2017 
0 1 
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Match Fixing Cases 
where OTHER(S) was/were 
involved 2013-2017 
1 1 
Corruption Index 
Average 2014-2016 
43,34 63,22 
 
 
           Graph 13- Mean of match-fixing cases depending on Penalty Severity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                        
What kind of relationships exists between our variables? 
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 To establish whether there are any relationships between the variables in our sample, we 
will use correlations- a tool that will help us to prepare the ground for testing our hypotheses 
using inferential statistics. However, it should be noted that this tool will only allow us to 
establish whether there is a correlational relationship between the variables that we will test; the 
existence of a correlation between two variables, however, does not mean that the one causes the 
other. Correlation does not necessarily mean causation; this is a topic for a different type of 
analysis. 
 Table 14 presents the existing associations between our study’s variables and whether 
said correlations are significant. The main tool that will be used to establish the existence or not 
of a correlation between the different pairs of variables is the Pearson correlation coefficient. As 
a rule of thumb, the stronger the association of our two variables the closer this value will be 
either to -1 (if the correlation is negative) or to 1 (if the correlation is positive). Last but not least, 
it is extremely important to test whether our correlation is statistically significant and that it did 
not occur by chance; a statistically significant correlation coefficient will help us reject the null 
hypothesis – that there is no relationship-and accept the alternative hypothesis that there is 
indeed a relationship. 
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                                                              Table 14-  Correlations between different variables 
 
Match Fixing Cases 2013-2017
Match Fixing 
Cases where 
COACH(ES) 
was/were 
involved 2013-
2017
Match Fixing 
Cases where 
PLAYER(S) 
was/were 
involved 2013-
2017
Match Fixing 
Cases where 
REFEREE(S) 
was/were 
involved 2013-
2017
Match Fixing 
Cases where 
FOOTBALL 
CLUBS(S) 
was/were 
involved 2013-
2017
Match Fixing 
Cases where 
ORGANISED 
CRIME was 
involved 2013-
2017
Match Fixing 
Cases where 
OTHER(S) 
was/were 
involved 2013-
2017
Corruption Index 
Average 2014-
2016
Legislative 
Background Penalty Severity
Pearson Correlation 1 ,472
**
,809
**
,433
**
,695
**
,538
**
,636
** ,199 ,400
** ,161
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,000 ,079 ,000 ,159
N 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 79 79 78
Pearson Correlation ,472
** 1 ,539
** -,095 ,439
**
,402
** -,098 ,105 ,243
*
,258
*
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,399 ,000 ,000 ,382 ,358 ,031 ,022
N 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 79 79 78
Pearson Correlation ,809
**
,539
** 1 ,085 ,516
** ,216 ,229
*
,226
*
,394
**
,295
**
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,448 ,000 ,053 ,040 ,045 ,000 ,009
N 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 79 79 78
Pearson Correlation ,433
** -,095 ,085 1 ,308
**
,282
*
,551
** -,020 ,129 ,011
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,399 ,448 ,005 ,011 ,000 ,862 ,256 ,924
N 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 79 79 78
Pearson Correlation ,695
**
,439
**
,516
**
,308
** 1 ,191 ,301
** ,027 ,208 ,085
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,000 ,005 ,088 ,006 ,815 ,067 ,457
N 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 79 79 78
Pearson Correlation ,538
**
,402
** ,216 ,282
* ,191 1 ,427
** ,099 ,158 ,096
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,000 ,053 ,011 ,088 ,000 ,384 ,166 ,403
N 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 79 79 78
Pearson Correlation ,636
** -,098 ,229
*
,551
**
,301
**
,427
** 1 ,156 ,259
* -,072
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,382 ,040 ,000 ,006 ,000 ,171 ,021 ,533
N 81 81 81 81 81 81 81 79 79 78
Pearson Correlation ,199 ,105 ,226
* -,020 ,027 ,099 ,156 1 ,212 ,487
**
Sig. (2-tailed) ,079 ,358 ,045 ,862 ,815 ,384 ,171 ,062 ,000
N 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 78 77
Pearson Correlation ,400
**
,243
*
,394
** ,129 ,208 ,158 ,259
* ,212 1 ,480
**
Sig. (2-tailed) ,000 ,031 ,000 ,256 ,067 ,166 ,021 ,062 ,000
N 79 79 79 79 79 79 79 78 79 78
Pearson Correlation ,161 ,258
*
,295
** ,011 ,085 ,096 -,072 ,487
**
,480
** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) ,159 ,022 ,009 ,924 ,457 ,403 ,533 ,000 ,000
N 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 77 78 78
Match Fixing Cases 2013-
2017
Match Fixing Cases where 
COACH(ES) was/were 
involved 2013-2017
Match Fixing Cases where 
PLAYER(S) was/were 
involved 2013-2017
Match Fixing Cases where 
REFEREE(S) was/were 
involved 2013-2017
Penalty Severity
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Match Fixing Cases where 
FOOTBALL CLUBS(S) 
was/were involved 2013-
2017
Match Fixing Cases where 
ORGANISED CRIME was 
involved 2013-2017
Match Fixing Cases where 
OTHER(S) was/were 
involved 2013-2017
Corruption Index Average 
2014-2016
Legislative Background
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Based on table 14, we will attempt to explore the relationship between the following 
variables. This analysis is particularly important as it will be our main tool in the effort to answer 
our research questions and test our hypotheses: 
Number of match-fixing cases and number of cases where players were involved 
The null hypothesis here is that there is no relationship between the two variables. The 
Pearson correlation for this relationship has a value of  .809 which show a strong positive 
strength of association. Moreover, according to the significance value  results the correlation is 
statistically significant and, thus, we can reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative 
hypothesis that there is indeed a strong relationship; in particular, as the number of match-fixing 
cases increases, there is a strong increase in the number of cases where players  were involved.   
Number of match-fixing cases and number of cases where referees were involved. 
 In this case, the null hypothesis states that there is no relationship between the two 
variables. The Pearson correlation for this relationship has a value of  .433 which shows a 
moderate positive strength of association. Moreover, according to the table, the correlation is 
statistically significant and, thus, we can reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative 
hypothesis that there is indeed a relationship; however, the strength of this relationship is 
medium. We could conclude that as the number of match-fixing cases increases, there is a 
moderate increase in the number of cases where referees were involved. 
  Number of match-fixing cases and number of cases where coaches were involved. 
 Again, the null hypothesis states that there is no relationship between the two variables. 
The Pearson correlation for this relationship has a value of  .472 which shows a medium positive 
strength of association. Moreover, per the table results the correlation is statistically significant 
and, thus, we can reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis that there is 
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indeed a relationship; however, the strength of this relationship is moderate. That said, we accept 
that as the number of match-fixing cases increases, there is a moderate increase in the number of 
cases where coaches were involved. 
Number of match-fixing cases and number of cases where soccer clubs were involved 
Following the same approach as above, the null hypothesis here is that there is no 
relationship between the two variables. The Pearson correlation for this relationship has a value 
of  .695 which show a strong positive strength of association. Moreover, according to the 
significance results the correlation is  statistically significant and, thus, we can reject the null 
hypothesis and accept the alternative hypothesis that there is indeed a strong relationship; in 
particular, as the number of match-fixing cases increases, there is a strong increase in the number 
of cases where soccer clubs  were involved 
Number of match-fixing cases and number of cases where the organised crime was 
involved. 
Likewise, the null hypothesis here is that there is no relationship between the two variables. 
The Pearson correlation for this relationship has a value of  .538 which show a strong positive 
strength of association. Moreover, according to the significance results the correlation is 
statistically significant  and, thus, we can reject the null hypothesis and accept the alternative 
hypothesis that there is indeed a relationship; in particular, as the number of match-fixing cases 
increases, there is a strong increase in the number of cases where organised crime was involved. 
This finding is consistent with the argument that organised crime is heavily involved in match-
fixing despite the low number of organised number cases that were reported in the countries of 
our sample, as we discussed in the descriptive statistics part of our analysis.  
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Number of match-fixing cases and number of cases where others were involved 
Similarly, the relationship between these two variables has a Pearson Correlation value of 
.636 which indicates a strong relationship/association and the correlation is statistically 
significant. That said, as the number of match-fixing cases increases there is a strong increase in 
the number of cases where others were involved. 
Number of match-fixing cases and legislative background. 
Interestingly enough, there seems to be a statistically significant correlation between 
legislation and the number of match-fixing cases. The correlation coefficient value of .400 
indicates that this is a moderate relationship, but due to its significant, it did not occur by chance. 
In a nutshell, as the legislative background moves towards higher values that indicate either 
criminal law provisions (2) or specialized legislation (3), there is a moderate increase in the 
number of match-fixing cases that are unveiled. 
Number of match-fixing cases and penalty severity. 
Unlike the descriptives statistics analysis, the results in table 14 show that there is no 
statistically significant correlation between penalty severity and the number of match-fixing 
cases that were investigated. 
Penalty severity and cases where players were involved. 
The correlation between the two variables is a positive, yet weak, one and it is statistically 
significant. So, we can reject the null hypothesis and accept that as the penalty severity value 
increases (moving from 1=no imprisonment towards 2=imprisonemnt) there is a small increase 
in the number of cases where players are involved. 
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Corruption index and cases where players were involved. 
The same applies to this relationship. Given that it is a statistically significant, yet weak 
correlation (,226) we accept that, as the corruption index increases-that is, the country is less 
corrupted- there is a small increase in the number of cases that involve players. It is worth 
pointing out that from all 8 actors involved in match-fixing, players was the only variable that 
had a significant positive correlation with corruption index. This could help us support the idea 
that in less corrupted countries it is likely to identify cases where players are involved. 
Legislative background and cases where players were involved. 
In this pair of variables there is a statistically significant, moderate association that shows 
that as the value of the legislative background increases, that is, as it moves closer to 2=criminal 
code or 3=specialised legislation, there is a moderate increase in the number of cases where 
players are involved.  
Using T-test as a tool to  test our hypotheses 
 So far, we have used  descriptive statistics and correlations in order to describe the 
relationship between the variables in our sample; however, although this approach has been very 
helpful in our effort to provide an account of the current match-fixing landscape and its scope 
across the world, it is not enough to help us test our hypotheses and answer our research 
questions. It is for this reason that certain inferential statistics will be used to allow us to 
generalize our findings or make inferences in the larger collection of the population. 
First off, we will conduct a T-test that will help us test a series of hypotheses regarding 
the relationship between penalty severity and the other variables. Table 15 presents some basic 
descriptive statistics: we notice that in case a country uses imprisonment as a punishment for 
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match-fixing the average number of match-fixing cases from 2013 until 2017 is 4,96 while it is 
only 3,48 cases when imprisonment is not used. That said, the difference is almost 1,5 
cases.Similarly, there are differences on the average of the other variables depending on the 
presence or absence of imprisonment. In particular, the average number of cases where players, 
coaches, referees, soccer clubs, organized crime or others are involved is different in countries 
where imprisonment is used vs. when those that do not use it.Moreover, it seems that countries 
that use imprisonment have a higher average corruption index (63,21) compared to those that do 
not use imprisonment (43,33). 
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                                                                Table 15- Descriptive statistics 
N Mean Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean
No Imprisonment 52 3,48 4,395 ,609
Imprisonment 26 4,96 4,219 ,827
No Imprisonment
52 ,21 ,637 ,088
Imprisonment
26 ,77 1,478 ,290
No Imprisonment
52 1,52 2,437 ,338
Imprisonment
26 3,23 3,037 ,596
No Imprisonment
52 ,40 ,748 ,104
Imprisonment
26 ,42 ,987 ,194
No Imprisonment
52 1,17 1,630 ,226
Imprisonment
26 1,50 2,159 ,423
No Imprisonment
52 ,29 1,035 ,144
Imprisonment
26 ,50 1,068 ,209
No Imprisonment
52 1,00 1,680 ,233
Imprisonment
26 ,77 1,177 ,231
No Imprisonment 51 43,3398 16,19693 2,26802
Imprisonment 26 63,2177 18,76292 3,67971
No Imprisonment 52 1,69 ,919 ,127
Imprisonment 26 2,62 ,496 ,097
Group Statistics
Penalty Severity
Match Fixing Cases 2013-
2017
Match Fixing Cases where 
COACH(ES) was/were 
involved 2013-2017
Match Fixing Cases where 
PLAYER(S) was/were 
involved 2013-2017
Match Fixing Cases where 
REFEREE(S) was/were 
involved 2013-2017
Match Fixing Cases where 
FOOTBALL CLUBS(S) 
was/were involved 2013-
2017
Match Fixing Cases where 
ORGANISED CRIME was 
involved 2013-2017
Match Fixing Cases where 
OTHER(S) was/were 
involved 2013-2017
Corruption Index Average 
2014-2016
Legislative Background
 
 
The results of the T-test are presented in table 16.An analysis of the findings follows 
below: 
 In the case of the total number of countries where match-fixing cases were investigated from 
2013-2017, the null hypothesis states that “there is no difference in the number of reported 
match-fixing cases in countries that use imprisonment vs. those that do not” As the sig. equals 
.547>.05 we will use the first line of T-test results. We notice that the sig. (2-tailed) has a value 
of .159  (p= .159>0.05) which shows that it is not significant. Thus, we will accept the null 
hypothesis and conclude that on average the number of match-fixing cases in countries that use 
imprisonment does not differ from the number of match-fixing cases in countries that do not use 
imprisonment.  
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 We repeat the steps described above for the other variables as well. In the case of match-
fixing cases where Coaches were involved, p=,076> .05 which means that we cannot reject the 
null hypothesis. That said, we accept that on average the number of match-fixing cases that 
involved coaches in countries that use imprisonment does not differ from the number of the same 
cases in countries that do not use imprisonment. 
 Moreover, regarding match-fixing cases where players were involved, we notice that 
p=,006<.05 and subsequently we reject the null hypothesis. That said, we accept that on average 
the number of match-fixing cases that involve players is higher in countries that imprisonment is 
used vs. countries that imprisonment is not used as a punishment for match-fixing.  
 The p-value in cases that involve any of the other four variables (referees, soccer clubs, 
organised crime and others) is greater than .05 so in all four cases we will accept the null 
hypothesis that there is no difference in the number of cases that involve referees (or soccer clubs 
or organised crime or others, respectively) in countries that use imprisonment when compared to 
those that do not use it. 
Interestingly enough, however, there is seems to be a significant relationship between the 
corruption index and the use of imprisonment. As the p-value equals, 00<,05 we will accept the 
alternative hypothesis that the corruption index rate is higher in countries that use imprisonment; 
in other words, countries that use imprisonment to address match-fixing are less corrupted than 
those who do not. 
Last but not least, we can reject the null hypothesis in the case of the legislative 
background given that p=,00<,05. That said, we accept that on average the legislative 
background in countries that use imprisonment is different; if we look at the mean value (2,62), 
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we can assume that this legislative background is closer to specialized legislation (represented 
with a value of 3). 
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Table 16- Independent Samples Test 
Lower Upper
Equal variances assumed
,366 ,547 -1,421 76 ,159 -1,481 1,042 -3,556 ,594
Equal variances not 
assumed
-1,441 51,986 ,156 -1,481 1,028 -3,543 ,581
Equal variances assumed
7,488 ,008 -2,333 76 ,022 -,558 ,239 -1,034 -,082
Equal variances not 
assumed
-1,840 29,728 ,076 -,558 ,303 -1,177 ,061
Equal variances assumed
2,552 ,114 -2,689 76 ,009 -1,712 ,636 -2,979 -,444
Equal variances not 
assumed
-2,499 41,579 ,016 -1,712 ,685 -3,094 -,329
Equal variances assumed
,661 ,419 -,096 76 ,924 -,019 ,200 -,418 ,380
Equal variances not 
assumed
-,088 39,808 ,931 -,019 ,220 -,463 ,425
Equal variances assumed
2,170 ,145 -,748 76 ,457 -,327 ,437 -1,198 ,544
Equal variances not 
assumed
-,681 39,697 ,500 -,327 ,480 -1,297 ,643
Equal variances assumed
,941 ,335 -,842 76 ,403 -,212 ,251 -,712 ,289
Equal variances not 
assumed
-,833 48,753 ,409 -,212 ,254 -,722 ,299
Equal variances assumed
,732 ,395 ,627 76 ,533 ,231 ,368 -,503 ,964
Equal variances not 
assumed
,704 67,548 ,484 ,231 ,328 -,424 ,885
Equal variances assumed
2,104 ,151 -4,825 75 ,000 -19,87789 4,11951 -28,08437 -11,67141
Equal variances not 
assumed
-4,599 44,399 ,000 -19,87789 4,32252 -28,58715 -11,16863
Equal variances assumed
33,430 ,000 -4,775 76 ,000 -,923 ,193 -1,308 -,538
Equal variances not 
assumed
-5,757 75,472 ,000 -,923 ,160 -1,242 -,604
Independent Samples Test
Levene's Test for Equality of Variances t-test for Equality of Means
F Sig. t df Sig. (2-tailed) Mean Difference
Std. Error 
Difference
95% Confidence Interval of the 
Difference
Match Fixing Cases where 
ORGANISED CRIME was 
involved 2013-2017
Match Fixing Cases where 
OTHER(S) was/were 
involved 2013-2017
Corruption Index Average 
2014-2016
Legislative Background
Match Fixing Cases 2013-
2017
Match Fixing Cases where 
COACH(ES) was/were 
involved 2013-2017
Match Fixing Cases where 
PLAYER(S) was/were 
involved 2013-2017
Match Fixing Cases where 
REFEREE(S) was/were 
involved 2013-2017
Match Fixing Cases where 
FOOTBALL CLUBS(S) 
was/were involved 2013-
2017
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One-way ANOVA analysis- test of our hypotheses 
To test our hypotheses, a One-way Analysis Of Variance (ANOVA) was used.Tables 17, 18 
and 19 were used for this analysis. 
a) The number of recorded match-fixing cases depends on the legislative background of the 
country. 
The independent variable represents the three different levels of the legislative background 
that pertains to match-fixing: 1)no legislation 2)criminal code and 3)specialized legislation. 
The dependent variable is the number of recorded match-fixing cases. 
An alpha level of .05 was used for all analyses. 
Since the sig. Level at Table 17 is less than .05 we have to consult table 18 which shows that 
there is a significant difference between the different legislative approaches. To identify the 
difference between the different categories of the independent variable, we need to consult Table 
19- Post Hoc Test. The Post Hoc comparisons using Tukey procedures indicate that there is a 
significant difference between countries who do not have anti-match-fixing legislation and 
countries that have specialized legislation. Table 20 shows that the countries with no legislation 
investigated 2,03 match-fixing cases from 2013 until June 2017 while countries with specialized 
legislation investigated an average of  5,85 cases. In a nutshell, countries with specialized 
legislation investigate more match-fixing cases. 
b) The number of the recorded match-fixing cases that include players depends on the 
legislative background of the country. In this case, the dependent variable is the number of cases 
that include players. Following the same procedure as above, the sig. Level at Table 17 is less 
than .05; that said,  we have to consult table 18 which shows that there is a significant difference 
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between the different legislative approaches. To identify the difference between the different 
categories of the independent variable, we need to consult Table 19- Post Hoc Test. The Post 
Hoc comparisons using Tukey procedures indicate that there is a significant difference between 
countries who do not have anti-match-fixing legislation and countries that have specialized 
legislation. 
Table 20 shows that the countries with no legislation investigated 1,6 match-fixing cases that 
involved players from 2013 until June 2017 while countries with specialized legislation 
investigated an average of  3,49 cases. In a nutshell countries with specialized legislation 
investigate more match-fixing cases where players are involved. 
c) The number of the recorded match-fixing cases that include referees depends on the 
legislative background of the country. In this case, the dependent variable is the number of cases 
that include referees. Looking at table 17, the sig. is again less than .05; that said,  we have to 
consult table 18 which, in this case, shows that there is not a significant difference between the 
different legislative approaches when it comes to cases that include referees. 
d) The number of the recorded match-fixing cases that include organized crime depends on 
the legislative background of the country. In this case, the dependent variable is the number of 
cases that include organized crime syndicates. Following the same procedure as above, the sig. 
Level at Table 17 is less than .05; that said,  we have to consult table 18 which shows that there 
is not a significant difference between the different legislative approaches (no legislation, 
criminal code, and specialized legislation) with regards to cases that included organized crime 
networks. 
e) The number of the recorded match-fixing cases that include soccer clubs depends on the 
legislative background of the country. The dependent variable in this hypothesis is the number of 
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cases that include soccer clubs. Again, the sig. level at Table 17 is less than .05; table 18 revealed 
that shows that there is not a significant difference between the three legislative approaches (no 
legislation, criminal code, and specialized legislation) with regards to cases that included soccer 
clubs. 
f) The number of the recorded match-fixing cases that include coaches depends on the 
legislative background of the country.The dependent variable in this hypothesis is the number of 
cases that include coaches. The sig. level for cases that involve coaches in Table 17 is less than 
.05;  we then swift to table 18 which shows that there is not a significant difference between the 
different legislative approaches. That said, we accept the null hypothesis that states that there is 
no relationship between the number of the recorded match-fixing cases that include coaches 
depend on the legislative background of the country. 
g) The number of the recorded match-fixing cases that include others depends on the 
legislative background of the country. The dependent variable in our hypothesis is the number of 
cases that include others (bookmakers, politicians, etc.). Following the same procedure as above, 
the sig. Level at Table 17 is less than .05; that said,  we have to consult table 18 which shows 
that there is no significant difference between the different legislative approaches (using Brown-
Forsythe procedures). Then, we accept the null hypothesis that the number of recorded cases that 
include others has no relationship with the legislative background of the country. 
h)There is a significant relationship between the corruption index of the country and the 
legislative background that pertains to match-fixing.Since the test for homogeneity of variance is 
not significant sig=.212 >.05, the assumption underlying the application of Analysis Of Variance 
has been met. Tha ANOVA table (table 21)  revealed a score of,020 that shows a significant 
difference between the three distinct categories of legislative approach. 
 72 
 
Moreover, to identify the difference between the three categories of the independent variable, 
we need to consult Table 19- Post Hoc Test. The Post Hoc comparisons using Tukey procedures 
indicate that there is a significant difference between countries who do not have anti-match-
fixing legislation and countries that use criminal law. Table 20 shows that the countries with no 
legislation score much lower in the corruption index (an average score of  42,9) while those who 
use criminal law to address match-fixing cases have an average corruption index of 59,2. In a 
nutshell, countries with no match-fixing legislation tend to be more corrupted compared to 
countries that use criminal law in match-fixing cases. 
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Table 17- Test of Homogeneity of Variances 
 
Test of Homogeneity of Variances    
 Levene Statistic df1 df2 Sig. 
Match Fixing Cases 
2013-2017 
12,127 2 76 ,000 
Match Fixing Cases 
where COACH(ES) 
was/were involved 
2013-2017 
5,573 2 76 ,006 
Match Fixing Cases 
where PLAYER(S) 
was/were involved 
2013-2017 
9,212 2 76 ,000 
Match Fixing Cases 
where REFEREE(S) 
was/were involved 
2013-2017 
3,217 2 76 ,046 
Match Fixing Cases 
where FOOTBALL 
CLUBS(S) was/were 
involved 2013-2017 
5,735 2 76 ,005 
Match Fixing Cases 
where ORGANISED 
CRIME was involved 
2013-2017 
3,141 2 76 ,049 
Match Fixing Cases 
where OTHER(S) 
was/were involved 
2013-2017 
6,467 2 76 ,003 
Corruption Index 
Average 2014-2016 
1,582 2 75 ,212 
Penalty Severity 306,368 2 75 ,000 
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Table 18- Robust Test of Equality of Means 
                             Robust Tests of 
Equality of Means
b 
    
  Statistic
a 
df1 df2 Sig. 
Match Fixing Cases 
2013-2017 
Welch 7,812 2 31,975 ,002 
 Brown-Forsythe 8,519 2 52,920 ,001 
Match Fixing Cases 
where COACH(ES) 
was/were involved 
2013-2017 
Welch 2,070 2 43,628 ,138 
 Brown-Forsythe 3,548 2 50,555 ,036 
Match Fixing Cases 
where PLAYER(S) 
was/were involved 
2013-2017 
Welch 7,588 2 40,620 ,002 
 Brown-Forsythe 8,926 2 56,530 ,000 
Match Fixing Cases 
where 
REFEREE(S) 
was/were involved 
2013-2017 
Welch ,751 2 31,094 ,480 
 Brown-Forsythe ,610 2 41,817 ,548 
Match Fixing Cases 
where FOOTBALL 
CLUBS(S) 
was/were involved 
2013-2017 
Welch 2,297 2 28,797 ,119 
 Brown-Forsythe 1,476 2 32,110 ,244 
Match Fixing Cases 
where 
ORGANISED 
CRIME was 
involved 2013-2017 
Welch ,918 2 33,597 ,409 
 Brown-Forsythe 1,260 2 50,107 ,293 
Match Fixing Cases 
where OTHER(S) 
was/were involved 
2013-2017 
Welch 4,051 2 28,686 ,028 
 Brown-Forsythe 2,880 2 38,856 ,068 
Corruption Index 
Average 2014-2016 
Welch 4,030 2 34,534 ,027 
 Brown-Forsythe 3,898 2 46,799 ,027 
Penalty Severity Welch     
 Brown-Forsythe     
a. Asymptotically F distributed.     
b. Robust tests of equality of means cannot be performed for Penalty Severity because 
at least one group has 0 variance. 
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Table 19 - Post Hoc Tests 
                                                     
Multiple Comparisons 
      
Dependent 
Variable 
   Mean 
Difference 
(I-J) 
Std. Error Sig. 95% Confidence 
Interval 
       Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
Match 
Fixing 
Cases 2013-
2017 
Tukey HSD None Criminal 
Code 
-1,754 1,294 ,369 -4,85 1,34 
   Specialised 
Code 
-3,817* 1,002 ,001 -6,21 -1,42 
  Criminal 
Code 
None 1,754 1,294 ,369 -1,34 4,85 
   Specialised 
Code 
-2,063 1,288 ,251 -5,14 1,02 
  Specialised 
Code 
None 3,817* 1,002 ,001 1,42 6,21 
   Criminal 
Code 
2,063 1,288 ,251 -1,02 5,14 
 Games-
Howell 
None Criminal 
Code 
-1,754 ,866 ,134 -3,96 ,45 
   Specialised 
Code 
-3,817* 1,036 ,002 -6,34 -1,30 
  Criminal 
Code 
None 1,754 ,866 ,134 -,45 3,96 
   Specialised 
Code 
-2,063 1,257 ,240 -5,11 ,99 
  Specialised 
Code 
None 3,817* 1,036 ,002 1,30 6,34 
   Criminal 
Code 
2,063 1,257 ,240 -,99 5,11 
Match 
Fixing 
Cases 
where 
COACH(E
S) was/were 
involved 
2013-2017 
Tukey HSD None Criminal 
Code 
-,058 ,319 ,982 -,82 ,71 
   Specialised 
Code 
-,541 ,247 ,080 -1,13 ,05 
  Criminal 
Code 
None ,058 ,319 ,982 -,71 ,82 
   Specialised 
Code 
-,483 ,318 ,288 -1,24 ,28 
  Specialised 
Code 
None ,541 ,247 ,080 -,05 1,13 
   Criminal 
Code 
,483 ,318 ,288 -,28 1,24 
 Games-
Howell 
None Criminal 
Code 
-,058 ,152 ,923 -,43 ,32 
   Specialised 
Code 
-,541 ,264 ,114 -1,18 ,10 
  Criminal 
Code 
None ,058 ,152 ,923 -,32 ,43 
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   Specialised 
Code 
-,483 ,269 ,185 -1,14 ,17 
  Specialised 
Code 
None ,541 ,264 ,114 -,10 1,18 
   Criminal 
Code 
,483 ,269 ,185 -,17 1,14 
Match 
Fixing 
Cases 
where 
PLAYER(S
) was/were 
involved 
2013-2017 
Tukey HSD None Criminal 
Code 
-1,196 ,817 ,314 -3,15 ,76 
   Specialised 
Code 
-2,367* ,633 ,001 -3,88 -,85 
  Criminal 
Code 
None 1,196 ,817 ,314 -,76 3,15 
   Specialised 
Code 
-1,171 ,814 ,326 -3,12 ,77 
  Specialised 
Code 
None 2,367* ,633 ,001 ,85 3,88 
   Criminal 
Code 
1,171 ,814 ,326 -,77 3,12 
 Games-
Howell 
None Criminal 
Code 
-1,196* ,466 ,040 -2,35 -,04 
   Specialised 
Code 
-2,367* ,670 ,003 -3,99 -,74 
  Criminal 
Code 
None 1,196* ,466 ,040 ,04 2,35 
   Specialised 
Code 
-1,171 ,712 ,237 -2,90 ,55 
  Specialised 
Code 
None 2,367* ,670 ,003 ,74 3,99 
   Criminal 
Code 
1,171 ,712 ,237 -,55 2,90 
Match 
Fixing 
Cases 
where 
REFEREE(
S) was/were 
involved 
2013-2017 
Tukey HSD None Criminal 
Code 
-,147 ,265 ,844 -,78 ,49 
   Specialised 
Code 
-,234 ,205 ,494 -,73 ,26 
  Criminal 
Code 
None ,147 ,265 ,844 -,49 ,78 
   Specialised 
Code 
-,087 ,264 ,943 -,72 ,54 
  Specialised 
Code 
None ,234 ,205 ,494 -,26 ,73 
   Criminal 
Code 
,087 ,264 ,943 -,54 ,72 
 Games-
Howell 
None Criminal 
Code 
-,147 ,267 ,847 -,83 ,54 
   Specialised 
Code 
-,234 ,198 ,469 -,71 ,24 
  Criminal 
Code 
None ,147 ,267 ,847 -,54 ,83 
   Specialised -,087 ,305 ,957 -,85 ,67 
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Code 
  Specialised 
Code 
None ,234 ,198 ,469 -,24 ,71 
   Criminal 
Code 
,087 ,305 ,957 -,67 ,85 
Match 
Fixing 
Cases 
where 
FOOTBAL
L 
CLUBS(S) 
was/were 
involved 
2013-2017 
Tukey HSD None Criminal 
Code 
-,616 ,574 ,534 -1,99 ,76 
   Specialised 
Code 
-,824 ,444 ,159 -1,89 ,24 
  Criminal 
Code 
None ,616 ,574 ,534 -,76 1,99 
   Specialised 
Code 
-,208 ,571 ,930 -1,57 1,16 
  Specialised 
Code 
None ,824 ,444 ,159 -,24 1,89 
   Criminal 
Code 
,208 ,571 ,930 -1,16 1,57 
 Games-
Howell 
None Criminal 
Code 
-,616 ,656 ,625 -2,32 1,09 
   Specialised 
Code 
-,824 ,404 ,115 -1,80 ,16 
  Criminal 
Code 
None ,616 ,656 ,625 -1,09 2,32 
   Specialised 
Code 
-,208 ,734 ,957 -2,05 1,64 
  Specialised 
Code 
None ,824 ,404 ,115 -,16 1,80 
   Criminal 
Code 
,208 ,734 ,957 -1,64 2,05 
Match 
Fixing 
Cases 
where 
ORGANIS
ED CRIME 
was 
involved 
2013-2017 
Tukey HSD None Criminal 
Code 
-,098 ,333 ,953 -,89 ,70 
   Specialised 
Code 
-,358 ,258 ,351 -,97 ,26 
  Criminal 
Code 
None ,098 ,333 ,953 -,70 ,89 
   Specialised 
Code 
-,260 ,331 ,714 -1,05 ,53 
  Specialised 
Code 
None ,358 ,258 ,351 -,26 ,97 
   Criminal 
Code 
,260 ,331 ,714 -,53 1,05 
 Games-
Howell 
None Criminal 
Code 
-,098 ,183 ,855 -,56 ,37 
   Specialised 
Code 
-,358 ,271 ,392 -1,02 ,30 
  Criminal None ,098 ,183 ,855 -,37 ,56 
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Code 
   Specialised 
Code 
-,260 ,305 ,674 -1,00 ,48 
  Specialised 
Code 
None ,358 ,271 ,392 -,30 1,02 
   Criminal 
Code 
,260 ,305 ,674 -,48 1,00 
Match 
Fixing 
Cases 
where 
OTHER(S) 
was/were 
involved 
2013-2017 
Tukey HSD None Criminal 
Code 
-,808 ,474 ,211 -1,94 ,33 
   Specialised 
Code 
-,866 ,367 ,054 -1,74 ,01 
  Criminal 
Code 
None ,808 ,474 ,211 -,33 1,94 
   Specialised 
Code 
-,058 ,472 ,992 -1,19 1,07 
  Specialised 
Code 
None ,866 ,367 ,054 -,01 1,74 
   Criminal 
Code 
,058 ,472 ,992 -1,07 1,19 
 Games-
Howell 
None Criminal 
Code 
-,808 ,476 ,238 -2,04 ,43 
   Specialised 
Code 
-,866* ,350 ,045 -1,72 -,02 
  Criminal 
Code 
None ,808 ,476 ,238 -,43 2,04 
   Specialised 
Code 
-,058 ,563 ,994 -1,46 1,34 
  Specialised 
Code 
None ,866* ,350 ,045 ,02 1,72 
   Criminal 
Code 
,058 ,563 ,994 -1,34 1,46 
Corruption 
Index 
Average 
2014-2016 
Tukey HSD None Criminal 
Code 
-16,30567* 6,04507 ,023 -30,7601 -1,8512 
   Specialised 
Code 
-9,23073 4,69561 ,128 -20,4585 1,9970 
  Criminal 
Code 
None 16,30567* 6,04507 ,023 1,8512 30,7601 
   Specialised 
Code 
7,07494 5,98780 ,468 -7,2426 21,3925 
  Specialised 
Code 
None 9,23073 4,69561 ,128 -1,9970 20,4585 
   Criminal 
Code 
-7,07494 5,98780 ,468 -21,3925 7,2426 
 Games-
Howell 
None Criminal 
Code 
-16,30567* 6,29872 ,043 -32,1511 -,4602 
   Specialised 
Code 
-9,23073 4,57909 ,117 -20,2273 1,7658 
  Criminal 
Code 
None 16,30567* 6,29872 ,043 ,4602 32,1511 
   Specialised 
Code 
7,07494 6,45091 ,525 -9,0626 23,2124 
  Specialised 
Code 
None 9,23073 4,57909 ,117 -1,7658 20,2273 
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   Criminal 
Code 
-7,07494 6,45091 ,525 -23,2124 9,0626 
Penalty 
Severity 
Tukey HSD None Criminal 
Code 
-,714* ,122 ,000 -1,01 -,42 
   Specialised 
Code 
-,500* ,095 ,000 -,73 -,27 
  Criminal 
Code 
None ,714* ,122 ,000 ,42 1,01 
   Specialised 
Code 
,214 ,122 ,191 -,08 ,51 
  Specialised 
Code 
None ,500* ,095 ,000 ,27 ,73 
   Criminal 
Code 
-,214 ,122 ,191 -,51 ,08 
 Games-
Howell 
None Criminal 
Code 
-,714* ,125 ,000 -1,05 -,38 
   Specialised 
Code 
-,500* ,090 ,000 -,72 -,28 
  Criminal 
Code 
None ,714* ,125 ,000 ,38 1,05 
   Specialised 
Code 
,214 ,154 ,360 -,17 ,60 
  Specialised 
Code 
None ,500* ,090 ,000 ,28 ,72 
   Criminal 
Code 
-,214 ,154 ,360 -,60 ,17 
*. The mean difference is 
significant at the 0.05 level. 
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                                                                 Table 20- Descriptives    
   N Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Std. 
Erro
r 
95% Confidence 
Interval for Mean 
Minim
um 
Maxi
mum 
Between- 
Component 
Variance 
       Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
   
Match Fixing 
Cases 2013-
2017 
None  32 2,03 1,975 ,349 1,32 2,74 1 10  
 Criminal Code  14 3,79 2,966 ,793 2,07 5,50 1 10  
 Specialised 
Code 
 33 5,85 5,602 ,975 3,86 7,83 1 22  
 Total  79 3,94 4,351 ,490 2,96 4,91 1 22  
 Model Fixed Effects   4,039 ,454 3,03 4,84    
  Random Effects    1,31
4 
-1,72 9,59   4,109 
Match Fixing 
Cases where 
COACH(ES) 
was/were 
involved 2013-
2017 
None  32 ,16 ,574 ,101 -,05 ,36 0 3  
 Criminal Code  14 ,21 ,426 ,114 -,03 ,46 0 1  
 Specialised 
Code 
 33 ,70 1,403 ,244 ,20 1,19 0 7  
 Total  79 ,39 1,018 ,115 ,16 ,62 0 7  
 Model Fixed Effects   ,997 ,112 ,17 ,62    
  Random Effects    ,193 -,44 1,22   ,066 
Match Fixing 
Cases where 
PLAYER(S) 
was/were 
involved 2013-
2017 
None  32 ,88 1,601 ,283 ,30 1,45 0 8  
 Criminal Code  14 2,07 1,385 ,370 1,27 2,87 0 5  
 Specialised 
Code 
 33 3,24 3,491 ,608 2,00 4,48 0 13  
  
 
8
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 Total  79 2,08 2,740 ,308 1,46 2,69 0 13  
 Model Fixed Effects   2,551 ,287 1,50 2,65    
  Random Effects    ,814 -1,43 5,58   1,568 
Match Fixing 
Cases where 
REFEREE(S) 
was/were 
involved 2013-
2017 
None  32 ,28 ,523 ,092 ,09 ,47 0 2  
 Criminal Code  14 ,43 ,938 ,251 -,11 ,97 0 3  
 Specialised 
Code 
 33 ,52 1,004 ,175 ,16 ,87 0 3  
 Total  79 ,41 ,825 ,093 ,22 ,59 0 3  
 Model Fixed Effects   ,828 ,093 ,22 ,59    
  Random Effects    ,093
a 
,00
a 
,81
a 
  -,010 
Match Fixing 
Cases where 
FOOTBALL 
CLUBS(S) 
was/were 
involved 2013-
2017 
None  32 ,81 ,931 ,165 ,48 1,15 0 3  
 Criminal Code  14 1,43 2,377 ,635 ,06 2,80 0 8  
 Specialised 
Code 
 33 1,64 2,119 ,369 ,89 2,39 0 9  
 Total  79 1,27 1,810 ,204 ,86 1,67 0 9  
 Model Fixed Effects   1,792 ,202 ,86 1,67    
  Random Effects    ,280 ,06 2,47   ,102 
Match Fixing 
Cases where 
ORGANISED 
CRIME was 
involved 2013-
2017 
None  32 ,19 ,471 ,083 ,02 ,36 0 2  
 Criminal Code  14 ,29 ,611 ,163 -,07 ,64 0 2  
 Specialised 
Code 
 33 ,55 1,481 ,258 ,02 1,07 0 7  
 Total  79 ,35 1,038 ,117 ,12 ,59 0 7  
  
 
8
2 
 Model Fixed Effects   1,038 ,117 ,12 ,59    
  Random Effects    ,117 -,15 ,86   ,000 
Match Fixing 
Cases where 
OTHER(S) 
was/were 
involved 2013-
2017 
None  32 ,41 ,712 ,126 ,15 ,66 0 3  
 Criminal Code  14 1,21 1,718 ,459 ,22 2,21 0 4  
 Specialised 
Code 
 33 1,27 1,875 ,326 ,61 1,94 0 9  
 Total  79 ,91 1,521 ,171 ,57 1,25 0 9  
 Model Fixed Effects   1,481 ,167 ,58 1,24    
  Random Effects    ,312 -,43 2,25   ,188 
Corruption 
Index Average 
2014-2016 
None  31 42,9029 17,17353 3,08
446 
36,6036 49,202
2 
25,33 86,00  
 Criminal Code  14 59,2086 20,54848 5,49
181 
47,3442 71,072
9 
28,25 89,25  
 Specialised 
Code 
 33 52,1336 19,44192 3,38
440 
45,2398 59,027
4 
21,33 91,00  
 Total  78 49,7349 19,51556 2,20
970 
45,3348 54,135
0 
21,33 91,00  
 Model Fixed Effects   18,77326 2,12
565 
45,5004 53,969
4 
   
  Random Effects    4,57
576 
30,0470 69,422
8 
  44,47661 
Penalty 
Severity 
None  32 1,00 0,000 0,00
0 
1,00 1,00 1 1  
 Criminal Code  14 1,71 ,469 ,125 1,44 1,98 1 2  
 Specialised 
Code 
 32 1,50 ,508 ,090 1,32 1,68 1 2  
 Total  78 1,33 ,474 ,054 1,23 1,44 1 2  
 Model Fixed Effects   ,380 ,043 1,25 1,42    
  Random Effects    ,220 ,39 2,28   ,126 
a. Warning: Between-component variance is negative. It was 
replaced by 0.0 in computing this random effects measure. 
        
 83 
 
Tabe 21- Analysis Of Variance ANOVA 
 
ANOVA       
  Sum of Squares df Mean 
Square 
F Sig. 
Match Fixing 
Cases 2013-
2017 
Between Groups 237,115 2 118,558 7,269 ,001 
 Within Groups 1239,568 76 16,310   
 Total 1476,684 78    
Match Fixing 
Cases where 
COACH(ES) 
was/were 
involved 2013-
2017 
Between Groups 5,290 2 2,645 2,661 ,076 
 Within Groups 75,546 76 ,994   
 Total 80,835 78    
Match Fixing 
Cases where 
PLAYER(S) 
was/were 
involved 2013-
2017 
Between Groups 91,055 2 45,528 6,997 ,002 
 Within Groups 494,489 76 6,506   
 Total 585,544 78    
Match Fixing 
Cases where 
REFEREE(S) 
was/were 
involved 2013-
2017 
Between Groups ,898 2 ,449 ,655 ,523 
 Within Groups 52,140 76 ,686   
 Total 53,038 78    
Match Fixing 
Cases where 
FOOTBALL 
CLUBS(S) 
was/were 
involved 2013-
2017 
Between Groups 11,478 2 5,739 1,788 ,174 
 Within Groups 243,940 76 3,210   
 Total 255,418 78    
Match Fixing 
Cases where 
ORGANISED 
CRIME was 
involved 2013-
2017 
Between Groups 2,162 2 1,081 1,003 ,372 
 Within Groups 81,914 76 1,078   
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 Total 84,076 78    
Match Fixing 
Cases where 
OTHER(S) 
was/were 
involved 2013-
2017 
Between Groups 13,758 2 6,879 3,138 ,049 
 Within Groups 166,621 76 2,192   
 Total 180,380 78    
Corruption Index 
Average 2014-
2016 
Between Groups 2893,348 2 1446,674 4,105 ,020 
 Within Groups 26432,646 75 352,435   
 Total 29325,994 77    
Penalty Severity Between Groups 6,476 2 3,238 22,368 ,000 
 Within Groups 10,857 75 ,145   
 Total 17,333 77    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 85 
 
Chapter Seven: Discussion, implication of findings and limitations 
 
This chapter first provides a discussion of how the findings from chapters four, five, 
and six, addressed the current study’s research questions (see chapter one). Furthermore, the 
remainder of this chapter presents implications of these findings for research and theory, as well 
as for policy and practice 
Discussion 
 
RQ. 1: The scope of the match-fixing phenomenon. 
To address the study’s first research question, chapter four examined the distribution of 
match-fixing cases across the globe based on the available data. We need to acknowledge that it 
was rather difficult to determine whether these findings confirmed to or contradicted 
expectations that were based on previous literature and research. Still, chapter’s four findings 
indicate that 81 countries investigated one or more cases with the average number of cases per 
country being 3,86 (mean). That said, roughly 4 out of 10 countries across the globe reported an 
average of 3,86 cases over the course of four years- 2013 to 2017, with the majority of them 
located either in Europe or Asia. Thus, the analysis in chapter four demonstrated that the 
statement “there is virtually no country that could claim it is immune to match-fixing” is more 
accurate than not.  
RQ. 2: The involvement of different stakeholders in match-fixing cases. 
 The findings presented in chapter four helped us address the present study’s second 
research question. More specifically, the results of the analysis showed that in the vast majority 
of countries football players are almost always present in match-fixing cases, followed by 
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coaches, referees, club officials and organized crime. An interesting finding of this study is that, 
based on the descriptive analysis of our dataset, organized crime syndicates do not represent the 
lion’s share, as often argued in the literature as only 20% of the countries in our sample have 
reported match-fixing investigations with links to an or more organized crime network(s). 
However, when we ran inferential statistics, it became clear that as the number of match-fixing 
cases increases, there is a strong increase in the number of cases where the organised crime was 
involved. That said, the argument that organized crime is heavily involved in match-fixing holds 
true in our sample despite the low number of organized number cases that were reported in the 
81 countries. 
RQ.3: The relationship between the existence of legal provisions and the number of 
match-fixing cases. 
There has been very little research on the relationship between the criminalization of 
match-fixing and the number of the cases that eventually are unveiled/investigated by the law-
enforcement and judicial authorities. The findings in chapter 4 indicate that countries that have 
no legislation in place whatsoever have investigated only two cases on average over the last four 
years. Also, those countries seem to score low on the corruption index as well; in other words, 
more corrupted countries seem to lack the legal tools and subsequently investigate fewer match-
fixing cases as the authorities cannot legally prosecute the match fixers.  
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RQ. 4: Criminalization of the phenomenon. 
An interesting finding of the current study is that nearly 4 out of 10 countries have not 
introduced any anti-match-fixing legislation whatsoever. That said, match-fixing is not a 
criminal offense and, thus, the authorities do not have the legal tools that are essential to suppress 
the phenomenon and prosecute the perpetrators. Also, only 3 out of 10 countries have opted in 
for imprisonment to curtail the phenomenon and punish match-fixing perpetrators. The findings 
in chapters 4 and 5 found a statistically significant relationship between countries that use 
imprisonment to address match-fixing and levels of corruption. According to the analyses, 
countries who have introduced imprisonment in their legal toolbox against match-fixing are less 
corrupted than those who do not. In other words, countries who rank low in the corruption index 
are those who predominantly have failed to use imprisonment as a punishment for fixers. 
Moreover, countries who use imprisonment are also more likely to introduce specialized 
legislation to address match-fixing; in other words, they won’t rely solely on the generic criminal 
code provisions. Our ANOVA analyses showed that countries with specialized legislation 
investigate more match-fixing cases.This finding is particularly important as the current debate 
on addressing match-fixing quite often revolves around the need to introduce specific  anti-
match-fixing legislation that, according to our findings appear to be more effective and 
promising. 
Last but not least, the analysis in chapter 5 highlighted that countries with no match-
fixing legislation tend to be more corrupted compared to countries that use criminal law in 
match-fixing cases. Again, this demonstrates the need to provide both technical and logistic 
support to more corrupted countries to help them introduce sustainable and effective anti-match-
fixing tools. 
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RQ. 5: Relationship between the severity of sanction and the scope of the behavior. 
 The analyses in chapter 5 and 6 address the present study’s sixth research question. The 
findings of the descriptive statistics show that countries that use imprisonment as a form of 
punishment for match-fixing have more cases unveiled and investigated. Descriptive statistics 
show that the average number of cases per country that enforces imprisonment is five compared 
to 3 cases in countries that do not do use imprisonment as a criminal justice approach. However, 
this finding was not confirmed by our inferential stats, and it appears that there is no statistically 
significant relationship between the penalty severity and the number of match-fixing cases that 
were investigated. There is the only exception: It seems to exist a weak- yet significant- 
correlation between the penalty severity and the number of cases where players are involved. 
This is particularly interesting when it comes to future policy implications as it could be argued 
that both criminalization of the phenomenon and penalty severity could prove promising 
regarding unveiling players’ participation in match-fixing. 
 
RQ6: Relationship between high levels of corruption and occurrence of match-fixing. 
High levels of corruption are often combined with an unwillingness to talk to the 
authorities and a subsequent veil of secrecy that covers the illegal activities that are associated 
with match-fixing. That said, it does not come as a surprise that, according to the analyses in 
chapter 5 and 6, countries who are less corrupted are more likely to investigate match-fixing 
cases and arrest the players involved. The most important finding, however, seems to be that out 
of all 8 actors involved in match-fixing, players were the only variable that had a significant 
positive correlation with corruption index. This could help us support the idea that in less 
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corrupted countries it is more likely to identify cases where players are involved as there is more 
transparency and more effectiveness.  
 
Implications for Theory 
There are several theoretical implications of this study. One of the goals of the present 
dissertation was to explore how three of the major criminological theories (i.e. differential 
association, routine activity and strain theory) could be used to explain the scope of the 
phenomenon of match-fixing as well as the involvement of the different stakeholders. The 
findings presented and discussed in the previous chapter provide some support for the 
differential association theory that holds that “criminality is the result of engaging in 
inappropriate behaviors exhibited by those with whom we interact” (Sutherland, Cressey, & 
Luckenbill,1995). In the current study, players involvement in match-fixing had a significant 
positive relationship with the number of match-fixing cases that were unveiled and investigated 
by the authorities. Thus. it appears that players involvement in match-fixing is significant and 
their role in fixing games is central, especially in cases where they are the only stakeholders 
involved. Additionally, unlike all the other stakeholders, players relationship with the number of 
fixed games is the strongest one. However, it should be acknowledged that this theory was not 
well-tested in the current research despite the findings mentioned above. Future research should 
continue to examine the nature of the players involvement, in particular to what extent they act in 
partnership with other stakeholders as well. 
As indicated by the discussions of the current study’s findings presented earlier in this 
chapter, theories that take into account both opportunity and motivation appear to be the best for 
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explaining when match-fixing cases occur. In particular, routine activities theory maintains that 
crime is most likely to occur when three elements—motivated offenders, suitable targets, and a 
lack of capable guardianship— converge in time and space. In line with this theoretical 
framework, the findings of the current study demonstrated that players and other stakeholders- 
especially organized crime networks- are motivated to engage in match-fixing cases and stay 
below the radar in environments where corruption is high, and the government has demonstrated 
an unwillingness to introduce legislative measures. Those legislative efforts would provide more 
“capably guardianship” as they would introduce a series of initiatives to criminalize match-fixing 
and, thus, preventing more crimes related to rigging. 
Strain theory is also well-suited in explaining players involvement in match-fixing cases. 
The central tenet of the theory is that a broad range of strains contribute to criminal behavior. 
Strains can be described as situations that are disliked by an individual. There are three 
categories of strain: failing to attain positively valued goals, motivations that are positive, and the 
presentation of motivations that are negative (Agnew, 1992). Strains can intensify, negatively 
affecting an individual by causing them to feel anger and frustration. To ease these negative 
feelings caused by straining the individual resorts to criminal behavior because legitimate 
approaches fail to reinforce positive emotions. These propositions are particularly important with 
regards to the findings of the present study; the findings presented here strongly support the 
notion that players are more susceptible to participating to match-fixing especially in countries 
where corruption levels are high, and the central government is unwilling to take steps towards 
the criminalization of the phenomenon. Thus, players who are poorly paid -this is usually the 
case in under-developed and corrupted countries- are prone to feeling anger and frustration and, 
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eventually, resort to criminal behavior as they fail to achieve their goals through legitimate 
means. 
The following table summarizes the key findings of the present study: 
   
Scope of the 
phenomenon of match-
fixing 
Involvement in match-
fixing 
Legal provisions and match-
fixing cases 
“there is virtually no 
country that could claim it 
is immune to match-
fixing” 
Soccer players and 
organized group networks 
are the two groups that are 
largely involved in match-
fixing illegal activities. 
More corrupted countries seem to 
lack the legal tools and subsequently 
investigate fewer match-fixing cases 
   
Criminalization of 
the phenomenon of 
match-fixing 
Specific  anti-match 
fixing legislation 
Prevention of players 
participation in match-fixing 
Countries who rank 
low in the corruption index 
–that is, the ones more 
corrupted- are those who 
predominantly have failed 
to use imprisonment as a 
Countries with 
designated anti-match-fixing 
legislation are more effective 
in unveiling and addressing 
match-fixing cases. 
The findings of the study indicate 
that both criminalization of the 
phenomenon and penalty severity 
could prove promising regarding 
unveiling players’ participation in 
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punishment for fixers. match-fixing 
   
Corruption and 
match-fixing 
Dealing with match-
fixing effectively 
Preventing match-fixing 
Countries who are less 
corrupted are more likely 
to investigate match-fixing 
cases and arrest the players 
involved. Additionally, in 
less corrupted countries it 
is more likely to identify 
cases where players are 
involved as there is more 
transparency and more 
effectiveness 
In line with “routine 
activity” theory propositions, 
any effective legislative 
efforts would provide more 
“capably guardianship” as 
they would introduce a 
series of initiatives to 
criminalize match-fixing 
and, thus, preventing more 
crimes related to rigging. 
In countries where player are poorly 
paid -this is usually the case in under-
developed and corrupted countries- are 
prone to feeling anger and frustration 
and, eventually, resort to criminal 
behavior as they fail to achieve their 
goals through legitimate means. Strain 
theory provides a theoretical 
explanation and potential solutions to 
this issue. 
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Limitations 
It is acknowledged that the present dissertation has a series of limitations that should be 
identified: 
First off, the data analyzed were available only for years 2013 until mid-2017. Thus it 
covers only a limited period.This does not allow us to compare different periods and potentially 
identify differences in the scope of the phenomenon after a certain event (for example before and 
after the implementation of a piece of legislation. Additionally, the reports were compiled by the 
INTERPOL. Thus it is not known if all match-fixing cases were included nor do we know what 
search strategy was used.  Also, due to the lack of a universally accepted definition of match-
fixing some cases might not have been included in the reports as well. 
As INTERPOL’s biweekly newsletter is based on mass media reports, countries, where 
the press is manipulated or suppressed by the government, might be less likely to report match-
fixing cases, especially if the government or state officials are involved. Also, in some countries, 
possible coercion by organized crime syndicates inevitably limits the dissemination of 
information to the press. Furthermore, in a number of countries match-fixing is a widely 
underreported phenomenon either for cultural reasons or just to avoid embarrassment as soccer 
plays a major role in the country’s social and political life (for example, in Brazil). Last but not 
least, match-fixing has not been empirically analysed thus there is no comparative context for 
this research. 
Additionally, it should be noted that a more comprehensive approach should also take 
into account the Freedom House Index that provides a measurement of the degree of political 
liberties and political rights in every nation across the globe. This is particularly important when 
it comes to the degree of internet freedom in different countries given that the data used in this 
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study was collected predominantly through websites. Also, it could be reasonably assumed that 
in countries that rank low on the  freedom index the extensive censorship, intimidation and 
violence against journalists would prevent them from publishing stories on match-fixing if 
governments officials and/or organized crime groups are involved. 
Last but not least, although it is important to have in place a comprehensive legislation 
that criminalizes match-fixing related behaviors and provides the legal tools to the law 
enforcement agencies to deal with the phenomenon, this is not a panacea nor can it serve as a 
“one-size-fits-all” approach. It should be acknowledged that other variables that are not easy to 
conceptualize and measure in a quantitative study could play a crucial role as well. For example, 
it is known that the local context and the cultural background and the interaction between the two 
shapes people’s bahavior; this could provide an explanation why anti-match fixing legislative 
measures in certain cultural environments are not as promising and effective as elsewhere. Also, 
even in cases where criminal legislation is passed by the legislature this is not always followed 
by a succesful implementation process for a series of reasons, including but not limited to, 
individual and institutional corruption. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 95 
 
Chapter Eight: Conclusion  
 
 Both the descriptive and the inferential statistics that we used for our analysis 
helped us achieve the aims and objectives of this project, respond to research questions and test 
our hypotheses. More specifically, our analysis indicated that the extent of the phenomenon of 
match-fixing around the world is quite serious; despite the inherently secretive nature of match-
fixing that prevent individuals from coming forward and co-operate with the authorities, more 
than 300 cases have been investigated by the law-enforcement agencies across the world over the 
last four years.  
Things appear to be quite serious in Europe as almost 50% of all recorded match-fixing 
cases occurred there. Moreover, players seem to be the most likely group to get involved in 
match-fixing cases followed by soccer clubs, coaches, others, referees and organized crime. It 
was established in our study that as the number of match-fixing cases increases, there is a strong 
increase in the number of cases where players were involved. This is a finding that demonstrates 
the major role that players play in the match-fixing process, particularly as no other variable had 
such a strong positive association with fixed games. 
 Interestingly enough, the majority of the countries in our sample rank low in the 
Corruption Index, although we have not been able to establish a causal relationship between the 
number of match-fixing cases and corruption levels. To explore this relationship, we would need 
to run a linear regression which is beyond the scope of this research, mainly due to its limited 
space (15.000 words long). However, we were able to establish in the present study that more 
corrupted countries seem to lack the legal tools and subsequently investigate fewer match-fixing 
case Additionally, nearly 40% of the countries in our sample do not treat match-fixing as a 
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crime; moreover, almost 60% of the 81 countries do not use imprisonment as a method of 
punishment for fixers. Our statistical results also showed that countries with specialized 
legislation are more likely to detect and investigate a bigger number of match-fixing cases 
compared to those who do not have any legislative measures in place. In particular, countries 
with specialized legislation investigate more match-fixing cases where players are involved.  
This finding is particularly important as there is a growing number of voices in the 
academic world calling for the implementation of specialized and effective legislative measures 
to suppress the phenomenon. Our findings confirm the validity of this approach.  However, it 
should be noted that our T-Test confirmed that the number of match-fixing cases that are 
revealed in countries that use imprisonment does not differ from the number of match-fixing 
cases in countries that do not use imprisonment. This is not the case though when players are 
involved; in this case, the number of match-fixing cases that involve players is higher in 
countries that imprisonment is used vs. countries that imprisonment is not used as a punishment 
for match-fixing. Nevertheless, it seems that it is the presence of a legal toolbox that matters 
more than the severity of its legal provisions. It is also worth pointing out that, our analysis 
showed that countries that use imprisonment to address match-fixing are less corrupted than 
those who do not. This finding applies to countries with no match-fixing legislation vs. those 
with criminal law legislation; the former score much lower on the corruption index -an average 
score of  42,9- while the latter has an average corruption index of 59,2. 
The present dissertation sought to shed light into a complex and contemporary yet under-
researched phenomenon; match-fixing was presented from a criminal justice perspective to 
assess its extent and identify the various variables that either promote or could potentially 
obstruct or curtail the occurrence of match-fixing cases. It goes without saying that this study 
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does not claim to be comprehensive; rather, it serves as the stimulant for further and more in-
depth quantitative research of the phenomenon. However, the latter is not easy to achieve given 
the nature and the limitations of the available data as well the limited opportunities to collect 
quantitative data. 
However, a series of suggestions was made based on the findings of the study. For 
starters, countries across the globe- especially the ones who are prone to corruption- should 
implement and effectively use specialized legislation on match-fixing. Unless said legislation is 
introduced, the majority of match-fixing plots will remain below the radar maintaining a 
deceiving sense of immunity from the phenomenon. Second and most important, more attention 
should be paid to the role of players in match-fixing as our statistical findings suggest that their 
involvement in match-fixing cases is not only significant but quite extensive as well. The 
complexity and the secretive nature of the phenomenon make it hard to detect and difficult to 
address. However, a multidisciplinary approach that will involve soccer stakeholders and 
criminal justices officials could produce promising results in the long term. 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX 1 – Dissertation timeline 
             
2016 Jan Feb Mar 
Ap
r 
May Jun Jul 
Au
g 
Sep Oct 
No
v 
Dec 
Building literature review      X X X X X X X 
Solicit dissertation chairperson, 
committee members & external readers 
X X X X X        
IRB application and approval    X X X       
Collect Data (INTERPOL etc.)      X X X X X X X 
Code and begin data analysis        X X X X X 
Compose the proposal         X X X X 
2017 Jan Feb Mar 
Ap
r 
May Jun Jul Au Sep Oct 
No
v 
Dec 
Proposal finalized X X           
Finalize data coding and 
quantification  
X X X X         
Proposal defense       X       
Continue to write dissertation      X X X X X X  
Continue submitting 
chapters/sections to committee & 
     X X X X X   
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readers for review & feedback 
Finalize edits         X X   
File for defense          X X  
Defend dissertation           X X 
 
APPENDIX 2 –Projected Dissertation Budget 
Item 
Quanti
ty 
Item 
Cost 
Cost 
Access to the Internet, electronic books and academic journals 
databases and library for academic sources. 
- - - 
SPSS software will be downloaded from the university website to 
conduct statistical analysis. 
- - - 
Use of a pre-owned laptop computer to type the dissertation.
1
  - - - 
Printing and photocopying of material (articles etc.) 25 $2 $50 
Dissertation binding 3 $50 $150 
TOTAL PROJECTED COST   $200 
                                                          
1
 All electronic dissertation- related materials are stored on a password-protected computer used only by this 
researcher. 
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Appendix 3 – Map of Match-fixing cases reported in 2013 
The map shows displays the countries where match-fixing cases were reported in 2013 alone 
(in red). 
 
 Source: Interpol (2013) as reference. 
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Appendix 4- Sample Interpol Report 
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